REVIVAL OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

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Revival of the German empire
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The Swamp

When a tremendous misfortune befalls a person, it reveals how much strength and goodness are within them. When fate crushes a nation, it reveals its inner greatness or pettiness. Only the utmost danger allows no more room for error regarding the historical rank of a nation.

In the greatest of all wars, we were denied the fortune of the soldier. Thanks to our energy, labor, and organizational skills, we had experienced an economic rise that was granted to only a few nations and was even possible. We fought and endured for four years, perhaps like no other nation before, but the defeat suddenly revealed a wretchedness that is unparalleled in world history. Burning shame should seize us when we face foreigners with the thought of what we were and what we are.

But the fact that only a few of us truly feel this, that countless individuals comfortably settle in the debris of these years, that they have already forgotten that it could be different and was different, is part of what overwhelms one with despair in sleepless nights.

Do we deserve this? Have we finally reached the point where our national character condemns us? Boastful in good fortune, lacking dignity in adversity, cruel towards the weak, servile towards the strong, dirty in the pursuit of advantages, unreliable, petty, without moral strength, without genuine belief in anything, without a past, without a future—is that truly who we are?

Just because it is not so, because we can finally dare to draw a clear line between the German people and the instigators and beneficiaries of the collapse, we claim a greater future. But today, it is about ruthlessly seeking out the tumor on the German body in order to heal a long, insidious illness. It was not "Marxism," but a party; not "liberalism," but a party; not "ultramontanism," but a party; not worldviews, but Cooperatives and groups with an organized following and a purposeful method, which criticized, paralyzed, undermined the nation, rendered the war hopeless after a temporary surge of necessary collective enthusiasm, as they had previously hindered all preparations for it, in order to finally puncture the ship of state with narrow-mindedness and self-interest, believing that they

would thereby clear the way for a government ideal according to their taste—not for Germany, but for a party.

When I look back today at the slow, creeping development of this misfortune, the fateful turning point seems to me to lie in the year 1877 when Bismarck sought to win over Bennigsen for a ministry. For a moment, the creator of the empire considered placing shared responsibility for the administration and management of the rapidly rising country and the weighty tasks of its foreign policy onto the parties. These parties existed as something self-evident—it was the heyday of Western European parliamentary systems. In England, the Conservatives had their most successful ministry under Disraeli at that time—and Bismarck himself had given them a clearly audible voice in the Reichstag. The goal was to educate them, as they had just outgrown the ideologies of 1848 and were now confronted with significant political realities that temporarily surpassed their understanding. However, they were capable of learning and willing to learn because they felt carried along and elevated by the current of development.

But this empire, with its always outward-looking founder, was so strong, with an admired and exemplary administration, an honest, diligent, brilliantly trained civil service, and a victorious army—forces that enabled them to solve even the most difficult tasks precisely—that they did not understand the need to give up a portion of their authority but rather saw the opportunity to consolidate it in a more complex yet secure manner, namely by incorporating the emerging party system, which until that moment had existed independently from and against the government. However, in 1877, this did not come to pass, and since then, parliamentarians have been excluded from any responsible governance. A German government has never understood political education. Here, the need for authority, rooted in the unfavorable circumstances of our Central European situation, proved fatal. They relinquished the understanding, independent judgment, and internal cooperation of the people because they were confident in the excellent execution of all measures. And just as little as the German Reich understood how to educate the people—for the Reich—the schools remained humanistic, the teachers diligent and patriotic but detached from the world and politically ignorant, always considering the Battle of Marathon to be more important than the Congress of Berlin. Similarly, it failed to educate parties and the press, which were merely seen as obstacles to authority, without realizing the immeasurable possibilities that any other country had long been fully exploiting.

If the government had started cautiously at that time, appointing individual talented party members to lead a ministry and assigning the political editor of a major newspaper with a diplomatic mission, a different, statesmanlike, practical ambition would have emerged, and criticism would have become much more cautious, as they could find themselves in a situation where they would have to do better tomorrow. But instead, the parliament became a grumbling chamber without shared responsibility, irritated by the gift of power without permission to use it, consumed by unrestricted, corrosive criticism as its sole remaining activity, dull, limited, bourgeois, arrogant, and the level of discourse sank lower and lower after the passing of the first generation. Between the government's monumental achievements and a people that neither saw them nor understood their significance and therefore only complained about the "burdens," an increasingly negative layer formed, the apex of beer hall organizations throughout the country, devoid of a sense of responsibility because none was given to them, negotiating their consent to laws on a case-by-case basis with the government as if it were a foreign and hostile power—not much different from a band of robbers negotiating ransom with travelers—sullen or gleeful, easily swayed by the jealousy of one party towards another: this was the poisonous, dumbing down, and destructive style of domestic politics that inevitably arose from that mistake that could no longer be rectified soon after 1877.

These parties were far from being sections of the people like in England; they were swarms of parasites on the body of the empire, and the people, the German "Michel," politically untrained, amusedly watched the duel between ministers and party leaders, sympathizing with fundamental opposition due to their lack of education, without realizing that it concerned their own fate. Thus, this layer acquired a tradition of negation and a principle of selection that produced increasingly inferior offspring, which now poisoned the working class through socialist rhetoric that claimed class struggle was more important than major politics, the middle class through liberal views that economic policy was more important, and the Catholics through the Center Party's habit of allocating resources for major politics as a foreign affair, only in exchange for satisfying party demands. In all cases, the understanding of this politics, the only one that determines the existence of nations and has been pursued with increasing energy around us since the Congress of Berlin in 1878, faded away—faded away in the people, in the parties, and finally in the press, which, in contrast to the pre-March era, increasingly served the taste of petty bourgeois know-it-all attitudes.

The offspring is worth as much as the highest achievable power: that is Napoleon's secret, with the marshal's baton in the backpack of every soldier. Since the career of a representative - and that of a political newspaper editor - had become a dead end, it attracted all the little strivers, complainers, sycophants, and dogmatists, everything that grows near German beer without any personal talent. Personalities did not enter; they disappeared into industry and abroad. Politics withered due to a lack of talent, for as a countermeasure, this party activity ensured that the government treated everything diplomatic with emphasis as an internal administrative task, and therefore more schematically than tactically. It worked alone, and this work was finally considered almost a private matter of its representatives. As a result, during this period of impending discharge, there was no political enlightenment at all, as schools, parties, and the press all failed equally. The German people did not know their terribly endangered and perhaps already hopeless situation before the war; they did not sense it during the war, and they are still just as far from it today because these three political educators of modern nations have sunk even deeper since then, unlike any other country, with the parties leading the way.

What is now called nationalism is nothing but the awareness of the leading strata of all nations regarding the immense dangers of the world situation since the war has disrupted all conditions. There is a possibility that entire states and nations may disappear in the coming discharges, as was the case with the Habsburg Empire and the Russian upper class. The responsible circles of all nations are at their posts - only the fools, cowards, and criminals who stand in their place in our country believe or pretend to believe that renouncing world politics protects them from its consequences.

These parties clung to the liberal interpretation of economic policy and the socialist concept of class struggle even after 1914. And since the Bethmann-Hollweg government, weak and lacking understanding as it was, resembling the French government of 1789 in that regard, instead of directing the party clique in its already questionable composition, which would have been easy for a minister with an English education, it provoked them and then demonstrated their indispensability through flattery. Thus, while the factions were silenced by the wave of enthusiasm in 1914, they were not convinced. Some wanted to see this powerful state weakened, while others did not want it to exist at all. "Germany, it is our firm will, shall lower its war flag forever, without having brought it back victorious for the last time," was the secret goal of the fundamental opposition.

And when the politically uneducated masses, deceived about the danger, began to perceive the duration of the war with fear and resentment, they went to work. The downfall of the state in the insignificant person of Bethmann was the first blow, and the stab in the back of the army was the second step.

And here, it became evident what kind of material the government had bred within the parties. While revealing all the weaknesses of the situation to the enemies through anxious or ideological talk of peace in parliament and the press, and with the daily sport of overthrowing ministers, one after another block was removed from the state structure, and the final calamity descended upon Germany like a dark cloud. Meanwhile, the stuffing of high offices and the often-founded war societies with party comrades and trusted individuals, exempted from frontline service or provided with lucrative contracts, began. Foreign policy became a no less profitable venture for private individuals to pursue on their own initiative, as the prehistory of the Eastern peace treaties will one day reveal. And the more the power of the party clique grew, as it could command any government and bestow any position, the more the following of dubious elements swelled, seeking political influence or even the business itself.

With this collapse, the people mentally broke down, the state dissolved from the top down, and the army lost its moral foundation, which became shockingly apparent for the first time on August 8, 1918, at Cambrai. And then came the unprecedented step, unparalleled in history in terms of spirit, achievement, lofty aspirations, and sentiments, towards the base and the basest of things. Over the ruins of the German world power, amidst the two million corpses of fallen heroes who died in vain, and over the people languishing in misery and anguish, the dictatorship of the party cliques was established in Weimar with a smiling satisfaction. It was the same community of the most limited and sordid interests that had undermined our position since 1917 and committed all kinds of betrayal, from overthrowing capable individuals due to their accomplishments to engaging in their own deeds in collusion with Northcliffe, Trotsky, and even Clemenceau. It was the final repetition of the

Reichstag resolution of March 23, 1895, in which congratulations were denied to the founder of the Reich.

This consortium, which was not elected in 1919 but allowed itself to be elected, was no different from the Bolsheviks in Moscow, in the wretchedness of their desires and actions: equally small in number, equally determined to stay on top,

equally unwilling to let go of anything. But there, they aimed to achieve a grand world goal despite everything and wade through rivers of blood with terrible energy to reach it; here, they aimed to secure their inheritance and buy permission from the enemy at any cost. After the heroes of the coalition had fled to every corner before the collapse, they emerged again with sudden zeal when they saw the Spartacists alone with the loot. Out of fear for their share of the spoils, the German Republic arose in the grand ducal armchairs and in the taverns of Weimar, not as a form of government, but as a company. In their statutes, there is no mention of the people, but of parties; not of power, honor, and greatness, but of parties. We no longer have a homeland, but parties; not rights, but parties; no goal, no future, but the interests of parties. And these parties – I repeat, not sections of the people, but commercial enterprises with a paid bureaucratic apparatus – were determined to surrender everything the enemy desired, to sign every demand, to awaken in him the courage for ever more audacious claims, just so they could pursue their own goals internally. They were determined to sacrifice every principle, every idea, every article of the recently sworn constitution for a mess of ministerial seats. They had made this constitution for themselves and their followers, not for the nation, and from the armistice to the Ruhr capitulation, they engaged in a shameful business with everything from which they could derive an advantage – with the ruins of the state, with the remnants of our prosperity, with our honor, our soul, our willpower. In Weimar, the most well-known heroes of this farce got drunk on the day the treaty was signed in Versailles, and not long afterwards, leaders of the proletariat, equipped with high offices, got drunk in a Berlin nightclub with strippers while worker delegations waited outside the door. This is not an isolated incident, but a symbol. This is German parliamentarism. For five years, there has been no action, no decision, no thought, not even a stance, but in the meantime, these proletarians acquired country estates and wealthy sons-in-law, and bourgeois beggars with business acumen suddenly fell silent when the shadow of a corporation became visible in the party room behind a recently contested bill. Those who remained uninvolved, often without even sensing the meaning of the events around them, were condemned by their complete insignificance anyway.

It is entirely correct that the old and complacent democracy worldwide follows these paths. The American oil scandal has shed light on the war businesses of both parties, and from France, we now know how to amass a fortune through the reconstruction of undamaged areas and the national passion of the press, without

any capital investment except friendship with a minister.

The political influence of leading German industry (excluding Eastern agriculture) was greatly overestimated before the war. Even in very serious situations, their role was advisory in nature, and often not even that. Ultimately, the influential power of the high administration on political decisions was always paramount. Above all, big industry possessed neither political vision nor energy nor consistency, in stark contrast to the English, who, due to an old tradition, always lived in constant contact and agreement with high politics. After the collapse, these circles emerged as powers, not by their own decision, but because political power suddenly no longer existed. However, they have not become politically more active or farsighted as a result. This applies to big industry and agriculture, which represent national work tied to a specific location. On the other hand, the non-productive economy, from the actual high finance to the corporations with semi- or pseudo-industry, where commercial business, and under certain circumstances mere currency speculation, was only concealed by participation in production, quickly understood the advantages of the new situation. Since politics had become a business, businesses gained political significance. While in France, the focus of economic influence on high politics clearly shifted from pure high finance to heavy industry, in Germany, it shifted at a completely different pace from East German agriculture to the world of finance. These circles established close connections with the part of the ruling party clique that could follow their reasoning, and they excelled in covering up this community of interests through the legend implanted in public opinion that, on the contrary, industry and agriculture exerted constant pressure on the government, using their lackeys in the parties and the democratic press. The consequences became increasingly evident in economic and fiscal policies as the yield of the immovable part of the German national wealth was slowly sacrificed to ensure the continuation of the profits from movable assets not bound by national borders.

Revolutionary parliaments are practically worthless: filled with bourgeois mediocrity, lacking an understanding of facts, and devoid of experience. Minister Roland said in 1791 about the new legislative assembly in Paris, "What surprises me the most is the general mediocrity. It surpasses everything the imagination can conceive." The German parliamentary material was already below average before the war, as it had no real task at hand, but despite its lack of judgment, it was honest. Now, the tasks were there, but they consisted, as is

inherent in the essence of the inheritance of collapse, of private advantages, starting from the possession of a free train ticket that opened up the most lucrative business relationships in times of currency devaluation, all the way up to ministerial positions, and these prospects attracted entirely different spirits. "Politics is the continuation of private business by other means" should be the motto of this latest form of democracy. Even if these businesses lacked greatness - exceptions duly noted - good intentions were never lacking.

While the world was busy saving, paying off debts, rebuilding the economy, and pushing back the Marxist trend of the last years of the war, which was nothing more than an attempt to make entire nations and states objects of exploitation by a single class or rather their self-proclaimed representatives, Germany began to be exploited by the trade unions of its self-paying liberators. Thousands of positions were created, even in the villages; ministries were established, committees formed. The planned economy is maintained solely for the sake of paid positions; the nationalization of private businesses is initiated for the sake of new positions. Even if surpluses in these businesses immediately turned into deficits, the principle was upheld, and this principle was called patronage. Ministerial pensions flourished by the hundreds in the May sun of republican Germany, and behind the ministerial dance, one could see the open mouths and greedy eyes of a thousand party and union secretaries, party journalists, relatives, business friends who had not yet had their turn, and for whom new committees had to be formed and new regulations implemented. In 1922, a union official received one of the highest administrative positions in Prussia on the grounds that he was the last in his age group who had not yet received an appointment. Foreign policy was increasingly perceived as an interference in this commendable operation, and one day it will be known that under the name of "fulfillment policy," Germany's scraps were thrown to the enemy piece by piece so that one could finally pursue one's goals internally, supported or even guided by a growing French press in Germany and occasionally startled by the communism financed by France.

The distribution of ministerial positions among the ever-changing coalitions was based on spoils, without consideration for suitability, willingness to work, or ability. The major offices fell apart, left to their own devices, overcrowded, contaminated by party creatures; the once famous administration could barely hold itself together from day to day. The laws, which the old government always prepared meticulously, were introduced as raw material to be talked into some

semblance of shape during the session, while the task of making them usable was left to future implementing regulations.

Initially, the 1917 coalition undertook all of this alone. But then came a moment that a starving nation lacks the humor to appreciate. For a year, the German People's Party, established under the guise of reconstruction, watched, saliva pooling in their mouths, until they could resist no longer. We witnessed Judas having to share the thirty pieces of silver with the other apostles. And from that point on, a few ministerial seats were up for negotiation between the instigators and beneficiaries of the collapse, until the glorious declaration that this party made in the Reichstag one day: they had to take an opposing stance to the Socialists on the current law in the Reichstag, while simultaneously holding a different position in the Prussian Landtag because the coalition there was different. Marxism and monarchy were, as they say, off the stock exchange list so as not to burden the new trust, and since then, there were no more inhibitions. They were confident of the democratic press (partly the other way around as well), and also of the hostile foreign countries, as long as they were determined to represent any remnants of national pride and rights, such as in the case of the issue of guilt, only in non-binding private conversations—for the sake of the voters. From then on, there was no law that the authors themselves did not trample underfoot, such as the one concerning the presidential election; no reproach that they did not bear with a smile. Dirt, cowardice, and lies became commonplace. And when the outrage and laughter in the country raised fears that one day they would lose control, they created the Republic Protection Act, a law to protect their own interests, and its passage was easily achieved by threatening to dissolve the Reichstag, which would have cost the representatives their salaries. And when finally the creeping starvation that haunted the cities, the unbearable physical and mental suffering in the time of the most insane currency devaluation gave rise to a dull rumbling, it was not shame, not a trace of honor, but only the fear of these pirates of parliamentarism that prompted them to show a kind of restraint and display a suddenly awakened sense of responsibility. First, the fear of the domestic consequences of the collapse of the mark, then the fear for the "Rentenmark peace" that made the tormented people appear harmless for the time being. But I see in the leaders of this system a secret wish dawning, more villainous than any that came before: the desire to finally escape the consequences of a change in the people's sentiments by transforming Germany into a reparations colony, into a European India—a plan that could only be driven to its current self-evidence through the policy of

fulfillment. By legitimizing themselves as the implementing organ of the adversaries, they seek to render their position independent of any internal crisis.

In the face of this five-year orgy of incompetence, cowardice, and malice, one can only look upon the national right with bitter concern as it prepares to assume control as avenger and trustee of the future. It possesses everything that belongs to the concept of an honorable man: selfless subordination, readiness for sacrifice, personal integrity, loyalty. However, it lacks statesmanlike abilities, just as Germany has never possessed them, and today it is no more ready to govern than it was when it declared war on Bismarck in 1872.

It is a grave mistake of conservative circles, especially in revolutionary times, to believe that honesty, impeccable character, and warmth of sentiment can compensate for a lack of intelligence. Or rather, it is precisely because of this deficiency that they fail to grasp the tactical superiority of the opposing side, which always counters deep-rooted tradition—or inherited prejudices—with more astute minds. If one follows Mirabeau's desperate struggle with the court in recent years, one can see his efforts to impress upon them the resolve and insight of capable men, qualities he did not perceive in them. But the aim of politics is success, only success, which is guaranteed not by goodwill but by a talent, however unscrupulous it may be. The spectacle, not only in Germany but in all mature and advanced cultures of the world, is always the same: on the left, greater intelligence, often uncertain due to a lack of business tradition; on the right, "principles," even official and diplomatic experience, but condemned to failure by a lack of intelligence. Ultimately, both sides depend on the fortunate circumstance that individuals of superior instinct and great energy, such as Cromwell or Napoleon, take matters into their own hands, with the left usually finding the more willing and understanding followers. Only in England are the conservatives at least equal to the liberals in intelligence, and that is the result of an incomparable historical and social upbringing, fostered by the habit of conducting business on a grand scale. Trade, in its intellectual methods, is naturally closer to diplomacy than industry and agriculture, which have a greater affinity with administration and organization. If we do not move beyond the horizon of Fontane's "Stechlin," which gives ample cause for concern about the limited aversion of conservative circles to the business world in general, we will soon witness nothing more than a national episode in the shameful history of the German Revolution, and the consequences of that have clearly not been fully realized by anyone yet.

In my book "Prussianism and Socialism" written in 1919, I stated that due to our failed revolution, we are going through a period of Directorial rule before the Thermidor. It has been four years now, and the danger of the current situation lies in the interruption with inadequate means. What is generally not well understood, both in terms of facts and especially the psychological reasons, is this period of Directorial rule, the second phase of terror in the French Revolution. Its details are more common, dreary, and terrifying than those of the first phase because they lack any trace of greatness. There was no belief in ideas, goals, institutions, no personality, no deed, not even confidence in the longevity of their own rule. It was about saving not the Revolution but the revolutionaries, as Sieyès said in 1795. We tend to view the events as follows: the storming of the Bastille in 1789, then the regicide, the Reign of Terror, then Robespierre, and then Napoleon. But Robespierre disappeared in the summer of 1794, and Napoleon arrived in the fall of 1799. In between, there were five horrifying years that no one cares about today because they offer nothing reconciliatory to the historian—no man, no creation, no event. They were marked only by incompetence and filth. But they were there, and we should seriously consider the problem they present with regard to our own immediate future. How did this regression into a period of terror occur? After the execution of Robespierre, there seemed to be no restraint in eliminating his system. The Jacobin Club was closed, and its supporters disappeared from public view. In early June 1795, Paris expected the proclamation of the monarchy every day, which was only prevented by the death of the young prince in the Temple at that moment. The jeunesse dorée appeared, determined young men who had grown tired of the Jacobins and wanted to usher in a new era with fists and sticks, regardless of the weighty issues of politics, administration, and economics. Well, the Völkisch movement is the jeunesse dorée of today, emerging from the same cause and driven by the same spirit. They have the same easily ignited enthusiasm, the same urge for action, the same sincerity, and the same narrow-mindedness. Neither side, then or now, had any inkling of the weight of statesmanship in a thoroughly devastated country. They looked down contemptuously on cool deliberations and had little interest in seriously addressing prosaic details of currency, labor conditions, administration, finance, and foreign relations. It was enough for the Jacobins to feel their sticks on their backs. The short history of this movement has not yet been written, but the lack of understanding then is the same as today when it wants to build real politics on racial sentiments. However widespread, deep, and natural these feelings may be, they are not a foundation

for great politics or for governing or saving a country. Every statesmanship and every healthy popular instinct take talents wherever they find them. The French saw an Italian in Napoleon, the English conservatives saw a Jew in Disraeli, the Russian nobility and clergy saw a German in Catherine II. And in no politically educated nation in the world is this assumption made, even though the English and Americans certainly feel more passionately about racial issues than most Germans. These childlike economic views and utopias are so desperately German in the worst sense, so meek and provincial, and they completely separate the Völkisch movement and the immense thrust it holds from everything that should be taken seriously politically and economically due to talent, experience, power, and relationships. This movement seems destined to churn up the ground, but only to make way for a dangerous counter-current. Some may argue that at least it serves as a plowshare for a greater future, but the jeunesse dorée has not even accomplished that. It has only revived the Jacobinism and nothing more. The Revolution was ultimately overcome only by Napoleon.

The world economy has its forms and means as a result of its development, and Germany is forced to work within its framework or not work at all. In Russia, the attempt to disregard this fact cost thirty million lives, with the result that they are now seeking to go backward in order to at least lead the existence of savages. But Russia is self-sufficient. In Germany, which relies on imports, exports, and credit, the slightest attempt to shake the existing forms of interest rates or not treat the existing financial powers as powers would lead to a catastrophe that would bring us into the same situation within a few weeks. In economics, which even experts sometimes underestimate, it matters much less about the "correctness" of views and the merits of new methods than about what the leading economic powers in the world want to apply as their method. The better insight of theorists plays no role at all, and in high politics, it is not about long skulls, but about what is inside them. The activities of the jeunesse dorée, which could not provide anyone with a sense of security, and the attempted coup by the royalists in Vendémiaire 1795, which was carried out completely misunderstanding the situation and was promptly suppressed by Bonaparte in sudden fear, gave the Jacobins unexpected prospects. Their political experience was somewhat higher valued, and they took advantage of this view. All positions, from consulates abroad to local administrations, were once again filled with their followers. In addition to the emigrants, their entire extended family, up to the third degree, was excluded from all positions and even the courts.

However, the elections of 1797 did not give the Jacobins a sense of security, nor did they give it to the new financial world that had amassed its wealth from the blood of the guillotine. Through the coup of Fructidor, to which Bonaparte again provided troops in order not to lose his command, the elections of the opponents were annulled, several hundred deputies, journalists, officials, and even two of the five directors were arrested and deported to Cayenne, the newspapers of the right-wing were suppressed, the Jacobin Club was resurrected, and a bloody regime followed, which was cynical because it lacked any belief in the ideas it represented. The first and very significant measure was to drop the investigation against the suppliers of Jourdan's army for embezzlement. The lists of emigrants were brought back out, and everyone who returned was sentenced to death. It was explicitly forbidden to review the lists, although everyone knew that countless individuals who had quietly remained in the country, often without knowing it, were included on them by personal and political enemies. They were shot by the hundreds, and their estates fell into the hands of the Jacobins and their friends. The nobility had their citizenship revoked in a formal manner, and it was only now, not in 1793, that they collapsed internally. Thousands of returning priests were imprisoned, deported, or executed. The "terrorist reaction" (Taine) enacted a hostage law, according to which four individuals were liable with their lives for any action against a Jacobin. One coup followed another, and as a result, the elections of 1798 were almost entirely radical, and those of 1799 were completely radical. It was during this time (1796) that the great assignat crash occurred, along with an almost unbelievable level of corruption. At that time, the Directors - are such possibilities really so far removed from us? - offered peace and the cession of Ceylon and the Cape Colony to England for a secret payment of two million pounds: that is the legacy of the jeunesse dorée.

The fate of a nation does not depend on rights or constitutions, ideals or programs, moral principles or racial passions, but primarily on the abilities of the ruling minority. We must cultivate such abilities or perish, and we need political forms that have a cultivating effect, just as the general staff of the old army bred generals and the Roman Senate bred statesmen. Everything else is either present or of secondary importance. The art of governance is not the first, but the only problem of great politics. Everything else follows from it. This art has shaped world history. It has elevated tiny nations to the heights of decision-making and destroyed great ones.

To have a principle under which born leaders rise to where they are needed, a

political education that awakens, trains, and promotes the appropriate qualities while suppressing the opposite ones, and to establish a tradition that accomplishes all this almost unnoticed and with perfection – that is the essence of any constitution in which a nation finds itself, whether given by a ruler or decided by an assembly, whether it consists of paragraphs or customs. "Rights of the people" are ridiculous as long as they mean the freedom to be ruined by parties. There is only one right of the people: the right to the achievements of those who govern. If the transition from the 18th to the 19th century aimed to replace "freedom of the princes" with "freedom of the people," it could only make sense if the selection of rulers improved, their methods became more successful, and their accomplishments grew. The past century had to provide the test, and it has rendered its judgment on the democratic method.

The turn of the 20th century is marked by the necessary, no longer postponable overcoming of European-American democracy, or rather, what it has produced as the realization of its idea: the rule of high finance, the nepotism of political parties instead of the sovereignty of the people, the people's disenfranchisement through election organizations, paid elections and elected officials, and the purchase of the press – a development that only did not lead to nonsense where an old aristocracy remained in power by utilizing the new forms, as in England. The English House of Commons was the only parliament in the world where there was something to learn, but that cannot be imitated.

We Germans have lacked a hundred years to learn to move within these forms when they were timely. Now it is too late. We can only become a caricature of parliamentarism, serving no purpose whatsoever. Through our entire past, our race, and our circumstances, we are a monarchical people, dependent on a government that we entrust and empower, whether the ruler is called Emperor or Chancellor, just as the English are born republicans since the dictatorship of their Norman nobility, whether they adorn the structure of their society with a royal pinnacle or not.

The parliamentary age is irreversibly over. Its forms no longer achieve anything; they only burden us. The 19th century was an interlude with a haphazard and poor selection of multitudinous reigns between two periods of personal leadership. In the major countries, anyone with judgment who gathers their experiences near decision-making knows this, even if they remain silent about it. Those who are up to date had to be democrats in 1830 and the opposite in 1930, just as they had to be absolutists in 1730 and not in 1830. Italy has taken the lead

in this development through action. It is now more Prussian than Prussia itself and no longer considers a reversal. In France, the elimination of the Chamber through a dictatorship supported by the army is only a matter of time. In England, the tragicomedy of the labor government, equally short and burdensome, will put an end to the parliamentary goodwill of the Labour Party and, in the future, refer it to non-parliamentary means, starting with a general strike, thereby paving the way for the Conservatives to break with the traditions of the House of Commons and establish the unrestricted rule of individual leaders. An old example is Pitt's antidemocratic dictatorship with liberal support when the French Revolution threatened to spread to England. In America, alongside the old party machines, strong movements like those of the farmers are emerging, breaking the political tradition and thereby bringing forth the possibility of conflicts like the one in 1861, where a second president calls for the decision of arms for his cause. Wilson had long stepped out of the confines of the old executive power.

Germany is likely richer in statesmanship and organizational talents than any other country in the world. Whenever the test was conducted, such as in the training of the priesthood by the Church, the officer corps by the General Staff, the German merchant and technician by Hanseatic trade and Rhineland industry, the result was always superior to the corresponding one abroad. But in the political field, it has been a curse until now that some do not know their own strengths, others abstain in disgust, and the third are prematurely consumed by party cliques. We do not have established forms of political selection and education. We do not have a club like in England, a salon like in France, where talents are discovered, brought into contact with each other, and placed in their proper positions. We have grown too fast. We each live for ourselves and are helpless when we come together. In England, it is considered good form among the major parties, who are effectively ready-made governments, to discover, recognize, and promote talents. Our parties are too foolish for that, and our old administration did not understand the demands of the situation. It lacked a principle of tactical training that could deliver more than mediocre results; not to mention the latest party ministers, as they did not even desire such selection.

The necessity of new forms of government will eventually confront us. Certainly, no one knows the future, and significant changes in the structure of state power have always been the result of bloodshed and violence, victories or defeats, coups or revolutions, as exemplified by the German and French

constitutions of 1871, Napoleon's empire, and the Bill of Rights of 1688. But there must be a goal for the immediate future, as the existing conditions become untenable, and it cannot involve the expression of so-called popular rights and democratic ideals in laws that nobody bothers to consider their practical consequences in a timely manner. I repeat, a people have only one right: to be governed well. Since the masses, lacking experience and perspective, cannot undertake this themselves, individuals must do so, and they must be chosen and appointed correctly. That is the entire secret of all well-governed states, and all thoughtfully devised constitutions can only ensure - or hinder - what naturally occurs in primitive times through the rapid application of force. The prerequisite is the realization that the parliamentary forms of the previous century are outdated and irreparably corrupted, primarily because the great movable fortunes have entered into a relationship of sovereignty with party politics, which could not have been foreseen in 1789, and because well-organized groups with their own interests have formed everywhere, which must be eliminated if the government of a whole people is to retain its meaning. The decision, as always, lies in the chance emergence of great personalities, but the living form of governance must at least correspond to the purpose. It is, in a sense, the balance between the demands of the time and the available pool of talents. It must be flexible enough to allow significant men to fully utilize their abilities, but with the limitation that a capable average is also formed, which carries out the affairs of state and does not render itself completely dependent on chance. An excess weight in one direction signifies a lack of consistency, while in the other it poses the danger of a narrow horizon and rigid schematism. Additionally, one must never forget for a moment that the best of all forms resides in the unwritten, and the written should be arranged accordingly. Those who wish to regulate everything, as is the tendency of revolutionary assemblies, only succeed in causing the practice to deviate from the constitution very soon.

The forms that result, firstly, from the time itself, then from Germany's dangerous geographical and the political situation created by the World War – both external and internal – and finally from the German national character, whose characteristics are partially favorable and generally unfavorable for this task, would be as follows for the immediate future:

An extraordinary strengthening of governmental power with high accountability that does not, as until now, burden legislation and execution in the form of daily parliamentary deliberations. It is more appropriate today for a comprehensive

report of accountability to be given and accepted or rejected at certain intervals. Criticism should be based on results, not intentions. This is inherent in the concept of trust contained in an authorization. Ongoing censorship is already ensured today through the press; its repetition in a parliament has become entirely superfluous and only gives rise to the emergence of private purposes of vanity or business. The Chancellor has the authority to form a ministry of his own choosing, acting as a general staff, with complete freedom in the number, composition, and organization of the major offices and the entire governmental apparatus. Likewise, this authority in personnel and organizational matters should be transferred from the Chancellor to the highly autonomous heads of the leading offices on a case-by-case basis. The ministers are accountable solely to the Chancellor, and he alone is responsible for them. Furthermore, at his discretion, the Chancellor should appoint a State Council consisting of the best talents and experience in all individual fields of politics and the economy. This private council does not make decisions but discusses and proposes; it could occasionally convene in departments for specific tasks in public or confidential sessions. Properly utilized, it would become a high school for young talents, providing them with practical insights into the problems and methods and testing and educating them through special assignments. The appointments are based entirely on personal trust and can be permanent, for specific areas, or individual cases. In addition to this secret and private council, which has nothing to do with the "constitution" in the usual sense, there is a Reichstag elected from general elections, representing the voice of the people. It convenes twice a year for short sessions and grants the authority to receive the accountability report, exercise criticism, and acknowledge or reject the budget and laws as much as possible as a whole through a roll-call vote – and assumes the responsibility for them in a solemn declaration to the people. In the future, a Reichstag should be held accountable for the consequences by a newly elected one, individual by individual. In elections, the people's criticism of their representatives is also expressed. It is illogical and contradicts the concept of popular representation that while the government is accountable to the people, the people should not hold the government accountable for the consequences of its actions. However, since all current constitutions have been made by the parliaments themselves, they have absolved themselves of any responsibility. The government must always have the right to call upon the people to judge their representatives through elections.

The sessions should not be allowed to be extended, apart from the fact that the

Chancellor can convene special sessions with limited tasks. The sessions should be surrounded with dignity and solemnity as an expression of the sovereignty of the people. Attitude, attire, and language are not trivial matters. An assembly that behaves in a vulgar manner becomes internally undignified. Vulgar behavior, which is becoming prevalent everywhere today, should be punished as an insult to the most noble organ of the nation, with temporary exclusion, loss of mandate, and, under certain circumstances, a ban on re-election, imposed by the highest court.

The number of members in today's parliaments is far too large due to the amateurish concepts of 1789. The voting mass of the representatives everywhere hinders the work that only the few capable individuals can do and also leads to creating a convenient opportunity for questionable individuals with personal agendas to infiltrate. 150 seats are more than sufficient for Germany. Even then, half of them will only say yes or no as decided by the leaders among themselves. However, it should become a good practice to appoint experts for this task, requiring individual representatives to demonstrate a kind of qualification and not allowing the shouters, drummers, and pipers of organizations. Additionally, I would propose that five representatives of Germans abroad be included because the Reichstag has so far lacked the perspective, proper knowledge, and assessment of foreign economic and power relations, which are vital for us. To overcome German party conflicts and achieve the formation of capable judgment groups, the electoral regulations should make it impossible for more than four parties, and those representing less than a tenth of the population, to receive seats. Furthermore, a brilliant idea of Mussolini, which is also suggested in the Bavarian electoral regulations and belongs to the future, should be utilized: The two strongest groups—or the strongest one—should appoint 50 out of 100 elected representatives in proportion to their strength. It should become customary to recruit the best individuals outside the actual party life, who Germany possesses, and who would only need to commit to working with the group or relinquish the seat if it no longer aligns with their convictions. These members can be replaced at any time. In addition, each representative should choose a deputy who must be approved by the party and for whom the representative is liable. To overcome the corruption prevalent in all current parliaments, dishonorable business conduct or conviction for common offenses should immediately and permanently disqualify individuals from being eligible. A nation can demand the honorability of its representatives. The dignity of the task demands that every candidate vouch for their personal and business

integrity by word of honor. Anyone who has received payment for political activities in the service of parties or political organizations should not be eligible for three years. This is necessary because business politics, as is evident everywhere today, has destroyed the understanding that the representative is accountable to the nation and not just to the paying party. Finally, at the beginning of the session, the representatives must solemnly commit to not utilizing their position as representatives of the people for any personal business advantage, and on the last day, they must take a solemn and public oath of accountability, declaring that they have not derived any personal benefit from their position. Those who cannot take this oath are no longer eligible.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that the height of English parliamentarism also relies on the fact that, in form, the King conducts the selection of the Prime Minister. There was, therefore, a position that stood above all parties and business interests, representing the honor and greatness of the nation solely through historical and dynastic tradition and nothing else. Even if the actual influence only lay in approving the proposal made by the leader of the strongest party regarding the appointment to the highest office, it was sufficient to raise talent and integrity as the implicit prerequisites of this proposal. This moral foundation is lacking in states where parties negotiate and decide on appointments among themselves and are accountable to no one but themselves. The Germans are a monarchical people, driven by their ancient Germanic trait of loyalty and subordination to the internally recognized leader. They have been so because their location in Central Europe forced them to consolidate into a strong state if they did not want to become victims of all their neighbors. Such sentiments do not change in later times, if they ever can, and one day, when a ray of sunshine falls on our existence again, the dormant longing for this symbolic coronation of the state will seek and find its fulfillment. Only then can the form indicated here be completed; all preliminary solutions have something unfinished in them because the selection of the leader of government affairs is not subject to censorship guided solely by historical tasks.

(1) And, incidentally, how small, shallow, limited, and unworthy does the German phrase "Juden hinaus!" (Jews out!) stand next to the English sentence "Right or wrong, my country!" It is a mere negation, completely disregarding the fact that the most dangerous anti-German tendencies, such as the inclination towards international and pacifistic fervor, and the hatred of authority and success, are deeply rooted in the German character. Members of one's own race are always more dangerous than those of a foreign race, who, as a minority, must prefer assimilation when seriously presented with the choice. The English instinct does this, and with great success: anyone from another country is recognized as English as long as they use their talents, resources, and connections for the greatness of England.

State service and Personality

A nation is what one makes of it. On its own, every nation is incapable of fulfilling the conditions that the global situation has demanded for centuries, if it wants to assert itself or even just maintain itself. However, its fate does not depend on opinions but on people, not on theories or decisions about how things should be, but on personalities who can and are able to do what needs to be done. A leading type is necessary, one that synthesizes and develops the creative qualities of the people in light of their historical situation. The deepest foundation of England's successes since Cromwell does not lie in the emergence of truly great statesmen - they are quite rare - but rather in the fact that since the destruction of old merry England by Puritanism, a lasting stratum with a very uniform outlook on life and less brilliant but practical effective qualities has emerged, which, albeit unconsciously, shares the impulses and goals with the leading men. Without that stratum, they would have achieved nothing, and with it, England was able to persist for decades even without ingenious leaders. Puritanism, which ascribes moral justification to the individual before himself and thus gives him the magnificent feeling of security that what he wants must be right because otherwise God would not have inspired him with that will; the commercial economic mentality, which gives the individual complete freedom of action but does not support him when he fails; and last but not least, sports, which, in contrast to Jahn's impersonal ideals of gymnastics, make victory dependent on the personal energy of the individual, have bred a type of person whose tenacity has thus far been equal to any danger. In France, the type that encompasses the entire nation was not created by Louis XIV or even the Revolution, but by Napoleon; the Frenchman of the 19th century is a new person compared to the one from the Ancien Régime, and the impetus he received from the Emperor's example, his ambition, and his educational system in schools and the army, sustained him even during the World War. To breed in this sense can only be achieved through a tremendous spiritual experience or a great personality. We did not have a type that led in our history and possessed fixed characteristics. There is not only an English society but also "the Englishman," but until now there is no German, only Germans. Twice attempts have been made, on a smaller scale, to cultivate an extremely capable type, first in the creation of the Prussian civil service by Friedrich Wilhelm I, and then through Moltke and his creation of the Prussian-German officer. We owe it solely to

these two and them alone that we now know what matters.

"In 'Preußentum und Sozialismus' I showed how, instead of a society divided by wealth and poverty as found on the English island, a state organized by command and obedience had to develop in the endangered North German plains. For this state, without which we as a people would not be viable, the Soldier King created 'the Prussian' as its living embodiment, a concept that did not exist until then. Initially, the Prussian was a class characterized by unwavering sense of honor and duty, conscientiousness, and discipline. It was a class where selfless, hard, thorough work was natural, and praise was sparingly given and never expected. Frederick the Great presented this type to the world in an extraordinary achievement, but he did not develop it further. During the Wars of Liberation, we neither had a universally German type nor did we acquire one. That was the essence of the time, but we needed a man of exceptional greatness and exemplary character, and we did not find him. We had officers, but not 'the German officer' as there was 'the French officer' since Napoleon, statesmen, but not 'the statesman' as in England, poets and thinkers who only saw themselves as similar to one another, and instead of the French and English concepts of freedom, we had a German one that looked different in every mind, and a motley mass of professional, state, and life ideals.

Nevertheless, we possess highly talented and educable human material. Whenever someone had access, such as the Church in training its clergy, Bebel in organizing his party, or technology in its industries and laboratories, the result was always extraordinary.

Then came the Reich, Bismarck's personal creation, who himself was a late creation of the great Prussian king. It posed a challenge for the leading men to find and educate the type of people who could be entrusted with the future of this politically and economically rapidly rising world power, which was vulnerable from all sides and faced countless new problems. Bismarck and Moltke recognized this challenge but approached it fundamentally differently. The result is evident today, and I have no doubt that future generations will recognize Moltke as the greater one because he had a broader vision and a more far-reaching impact. He knew that he would not witness future wars and therefore established a self-developing tradition of military education within the Great General Staff, which rigorously trained each officer according to character, worldview, and performance, from lieutenant to the types of army leaders and chiefs of staff, ensuring that the selection of talents remained

outstanding and that the methods and means always stayed up to date. Here, we had a German type that was initiated in 1870 and fully developed by 1914. And since it remained the only one, it permeated the entire nation as an exemplary model, imprinting something of its attitude and worldview unnoticed on every individual, even on Bebel's Workers' Party; this is what foreign countries called German militarism.

Bismarck, on the other hand, left the government and administration as they were and only established his own office to suit his way of working. Like Napoleon and the leaders of today's German industry, he had the desire to do everything himself and only surround himself with assistants, creating actions rather than people for future actions, while English politicians and industrialists - incidentally, also the statesmen of the 17th and 18th centuries - early on trained juniors as deputies and successors, so that the work eventually found its own way and only needed to be steered in curves. Bismarck did not develop the civil service - quieta non movere! - but only increased it, just as he did not change the school in its principles and goals and, above all, did not transform it for political education. There was an outstanding diplomat - that was he himself - but no diplomatic school; there were ministers, but they were administrators, not creators, except for Stephan; and when he left, he left behind not a general staff, not a self-developing organism, but a leaderless machine, like Napoleon's armies were headless when he did not lead them himself. Men like Krupp, Siemens, Borsig, Ballin, and Stinnes were not created by this giant enterprise, despite its great possibilities, or rather, they were not allowed to come to light. This type of civil servant, which is now 150 years old, designed for a medium-sized agricultural country and never seriously renewed, already had characteristics in Bismarck's early days that no longer corresponded to the age of the first steamship lines and railway networks; for the Empire of 1900[217] with world trade, world industry, world transport, and the growing power of large financial fortunes, its brilliant advantages began to be ineffective and its flaws became an increasing burden. The lower class continued to do outstanding work, but in the upper class, which did not receive any replenishment from the Hanseatic merchants and the industry, there was an increasing ignorance and underestimation of the forms and powers of the world economy at that time, not to mention the world political ones. We were only militarily prepared for war. It was not even suspected that there were other preparations. The administration often became an end in itself; it petrified - that is the danger of the order state in peaceful times - it educated an unassertive and doctrinaire material of leaders,

whose spirit continued downward, so that it continued to work quietly when the revolution broke out, while in England every employee would have gone on strike and thus disabled the council state with sure instinct; the strong administrative talents - other talents did not develop; they were suffocated or went over to industry - became old and formal too soon, and even they came into prominence much too late through seniority. And unfortunately, it finally came to pass that our people inherited more of the qualities of the military type and the errors of the administrative type, because they were raised by the former and so to speak provided for by the latter. The immense importance of the education of the civil service lies in the fact that almost one-sixth of the population belongs to it in some way, that it is generally respected, envied, and imitated, so that its conscious training is equivalent to that of the entire people and is perhaps more effective than that of the school because it shapes not knowledge and thinking but action and behavior.

The greatest advantage of this old-style civil service lay in its moral greatness. In all other countries, civil service is a profession, a means of livelihood like any other. In Prussia, since Friedrich Wilhelm I, the civil servant has formed a class like the[218] officer and judge. His honor is not professional or bourgeois honor but class honor. The sense of honor does not attach to the work as in the old guilds, but to the fact of service, of serving in the Germanic sense of proud subordination. The civil servant embodies state sovereignty in himself. Implicitly, this entails his duties and rights, from strict outward demeanor and conduct to the smallest details of conscience and private life, and ending with silent dedication to a cause to which life is devoted. All of this had been realized to an astonishing degree and differed significantly, with its "nevertheless," in the toughest situations from the type of today's ministers who keep their private positions open, with a "then not" in the moment of danger. It is the Roman element in Prussianism and resembles the spirit of that soldier who died at the city gate of Pompeii on his post during the eruption of Vesuvius. This was the imperative at least at the end of the previous century. Hard service, meager pay, scant recognition - these distinguished those who initially sought merit and comfort from the masses. Conscientious performance was the norm. No one paid attention to it because it did not even come to one's own consciousness.

Let us not be deceived that revolution and parliamentarism have also destroyed this. Since there are unions of civil servants, party ministers, and the state as a welfare institution for party members, since often enough it is not performance

that determines advancement but zeal for a party, one no longer asks what for, but what one lives from, and the service becomes more comfortable, supervision more lax and burdensome, work mediocre, and the rest of the profession dissolves into a young generation of employees who no longer know that ethos.

But without a moral idea, the German civil servant is also inconceivable in the future, unless he is to sink to being a mere money earner. Without the civil servant as a class, the German people are inconceivable, neither as a race nor in their precarious situation. From the conditions of the 20th century, an idea of public service must be developed again, a moral sense of class that is capable of carrying the state in the future. Even though one knows that a man like Friedrich Wilhelm or Moltke is needed to bring living forms to life, to transform thoughts into people, at least one goal must be shown, and many must see it.

However, we have to seek out the errors of the old system, which existed alongside the admired advantages found throughout the world, which perhaps developed late but then had far-reaching consequences. It was unfortunate that with the examination of a candidate, the state effectively took on the obligation of providing lifelong support. From that point on, appointments, promotions based on age, salary increases, and titles all followed in precisely predictable intervals. There were no promotions outside the established order, no swift dismissal of unsuitable elements as in the military. On the contrary, in recent times, there have been instances where the number of positions increased because the number of "applicants" had become too large. But no one can bear to have the struggle for existence taken away from them at the age of 25. One must have seen how they were as students—energetic, agile, independent, with heads full of plans—and how they appeared at 35: lacking entrepreneurial spirit, methodical, impersonal, cumbersome, clinging to form for form's sake. Was there a civil servant who engaged in sports? In England, they all do, and they remain youthful. One-sixth of the population relieved from the struggle for existence! This has supported a negative aspect of the German character. The inclination towards carefree sauntering and dreaming beyond all reality transformed into a desire for the state's crib, for pension entitlement, which made middle-class happiness possible in a corner outside all the conflicts of life and the world situation. And from this lack of personal struggle and genuine concern, the Michels grew into colossal proportions, with their obliviousness to the political dangers of the pre-war situation and their harmless confusion of politics with criticizing the government through the newspaper of "their" party. But in

addition to this, there was an education that, in stark contrast to the military, initially burdened individuals with all sorts of academic knowledge, especially Roman law, and then, in the service where it should have begun, promptly ceased. An early personal and practical understanding of our shipping, ironworks, banks, or foreign countries was neither expected nor valued, and yet it would have been more important for all branches of administration, not just transportation and finance, than law and philosophy. The worldliness and ineptitude of the large administrative bodies in facing the sudden challenges of war were incredibly significant. It can be inferred from this the global perspective of the middle-ranking officials who remained completely uninformed, especially when compared with the unbiased factual view of completely unlearned but astute English bank officials. Furthermore, there is the collegial system of the 18th century, which no longer aligns with modern tasks yet still completely dominated state management. It not only relieved individuals of external concerns but also eliminated personal responsibility. Nothing has had a greater impact on the internal dependence of civil servants, their tendency to follow the herd, to await the decisions of others and join them, than the early and now customary practice of working within an anonymous majority where the judgment, will, decision, and liability of the individual disappeared. The military also instills early independence and responsibility in its officers. Battles are not won by "the military leadership" but by the general. Every officer faced dismissal if they did not personally meet the requirements. However, in judicial proceedings, it is not Judge X who pronounces the verdict as in England, but "the court." For significant tasks, a commissioner was not appointed, but a commission. Decisions were not made by a single person based on their position but by the railway directorate, the finance office, the ministry. Instead of prompt resolutions, there were endless meetings and committees, instead of a telegram commanding action, there was a hierarchical process, and instead of a two-minute discussion, there were negotiations over a joint session of two authorities. The individual disappeared behind the office. And so, the service evolved into the completion of routine tasks in a predetermined order; the mechanical hierarchical process prevailed, along with excessive administration and rigid frameworks. This offered no scope for free personality and creative ambition. Those who did not merge as nameless parts within the whole were inconvenient. "Men no measures" – that is Germanic! – was turned on its head here. Once again, let us acknowledge the great advantages of the profession, but these mistakes have been fatal to it and to us. Today, as we must start anew here

as well, the fundamental principles of Moltke's military education must be transferred to future public service.

For this new construction, however, a new German type has quietly emerged, which arose with the rise of sports in recent decades and the gradual intellectual dominance of industrial and commercial positions over governmental ones. It is the best product of the era of economic advancement following Bismarck, in terms of living material. It found its magnificent expression in the young volunteers of 1914. These "determined young men," to use a term, are our future —both as characters and as an established type—with the potential to be something significant if someone understands how to make use of them. Highly independent, persistent, with a practical grasp, quickly decisive, willingly shouldering responsibility and placed alone in a position, ready for intelligent obedience that they understand at a glance, capable of collaboration not through the framework of a service regulation but through an instinctive sense of what needs to be done now, they are a promising generation. You won't find them in philosophical seminars or in the literary or artistic scene. Worldview is not a problem or a source of entertainment for them. They fell in mass numbers at the front, but they are growing up again. For this youngest Germany, I would like to paint a picture of how I envision the state administration with them and through them, just as they are—clever, proud, personally and internally free, bearers of a German ethos from ancient Germanic times that has only now reawakened as the best legacy from the years of the rise of the Reich.

So, no provision institution, no candidates, no right to civil service except through proven merit, no entitlement based on any scholarly background. Even the Doctor of Law should get to know the mechanism from the bottom up. It goes without saying that a high degree of education, regardless of its source, must be expected in higher positions. A rigorous intelligence test at the beginning, as needed, conducted by experts, more as a test of practical aptitude than an assessment of theoretical knowledge, followed by five years of employment subject to termination, similar to the private sector, with the swift dismissal of unsuitable individuals without hesitation. Then the "major's corner" with strict selection and a contract for five years, followed by ten years with tacit extension, entitlement to pension, significant in the case of long and excellent service, but transferring family support to private insurance.

Great and increasing demands on character, intelligence, work capacity, determination, and understanding. Early independent execution of special tasks

(situation reports, organization and supplementation of materials, rapid organization for exceptional cases, and the like) with flat-rate allowances in addition to the basic salary. Each individual is recognized and their abilities developed; continuous and personal development overseen by a superior through example, criticism, and instruction; voluntary assignments to various personal missions, secondments to other positions to learn about all branches of the operation, whether they are commercial, technical, or legal. Instead of repeated exams, rigorous tests, such as independent organization of services at conferences or in exceptional situations, sudden substitution for superiors, participation in meetings, inspection trips with reports.

"The breeding of bureaucratic personnel must be fundamentally different for leading and executive positions. The boundary between the upper and lower classes should not, as it does today, be established through gymnasium education or blurred through automatic advancement. At the top, there are completely different tasks, qualities, and goals.

The qualities of the lower class cannot be determined more correctly than Friedrich Wilhelm I unconsciously perceived when creating his bureaucratic class. Exemplary conduct of superiors, exemplary spirit of the offices; nurturing ambition through praise and reprimand, recognition through assignments, intelligent discipline, intellectual independence. External demeanor is not a trivial matter. As a nation, we are formless and without manners; the civil service should have an educational impact beyond the offices in this regard. Cleanliness, punctuality, discipline in service. The service uniform should not be a matter of vanity but of pride. It emphasizes the sense of rank, the inherent qualities of outstanding performance and conscientious fulfillment of duty. Titles are also not insignificant, but they should be sparingly awarded as honors, highlighting a life of work and achievements. Titles that anyone can earn, like our dozens of pompous designations for the differences in chairs in the office, are ridiculous. Finally, recognition through study trips, even abroad, delegation to conferences, to support very high-ranking chiefs. And lastly: the promotion of sports within the civil service, officially sanctioned; fresh air, health, courage, pride in physical strength and agility. The dust of paperwork on the soul must become an implausible legend. The civil service should remain inwardly youthful."

The structure of leadership should be designed as the great practitioners have always done, like Moltke in the military and the most successful leaders in the

private sector. It should consist of a thin, flexible tip of utmost performance. In our case, the high positions are built too densely and sluggishly; half of the officials should be able to double their output while maintaining great autonomy. There should be no fixed positions for chiefs within a rigid service order, but rather personal authorizations on a case-by-case basis. The transfer of responsibilities should come with a disposal fund and absolute freedom in organizational and personnel matters. A personal staff of collaborators, advisory experts, and deputies should be formed. Seniority should not determine promotion. The youngest cashier should be able to rise to the position of a private secretary to a CEO with a leap if the CEO deems them capable and is willing to take responsibility for it. The inclusion of particularly suitable individuals from private enterprises should not be excluded. Great talents should be given complete freedom within the limits set by tact and consideration for the general course of affairs. Extensive decentralization is necessary, dividing large offices into highly autonomous positions with varying degrees of authority and corresponding personal liability. This is how great talents are discovered and nurtured. Personal relationships and oral communication between leaders should replace the hierarchical structure and bureaucratic paper trail. Everything should be organized based on extensive experience, quick personal decision-making, and superior comprehension among the executive bodies. A high, intellectual, and energetic tradition of conducting business and, even more importantly, nurturing a competent succession should be established.

Entering this higher circle should be a risk that can always be revoked but should also be open to the lowest-ranking officials. There should be no mechanical advancement but voluntary application regardless of age and previous position. There should be no fixed hierarchy of high positions and titles. Instead of titles, the designation "entrusted with" should be used, indicating temporary assignment to significant tasks and the option to return to the original rank if the attempt fails. There should be a continuous basic salary based on seniority but very high allowances for these assignments, proportional to the extent of authority and responsibility, and only for the duration of the assignment. Youth should never be an obstacle; in fact, we must strive for a system where a telegraph messenger can become a State Secretary in three years and where ministers of 25 years of age are possible, like Pitt in England and the Bonapartes in France. Only when every young person feels the marshal's baton in their knapsack and when there are no longer any obstacles of age, position, or promotion speed for brilliant individuals, will we achieve the complete

utilization of talents that remain undiscovered and wasted in Germany today due to a system with prematurely aged and rigid "functionaries."

The goal of this breeding is to create a layer of top-ranking commanders. Leadership qualities must be discovered, developed, and refined to perfection through the course of affairs and great personal freedom. In this context, the sense of rank is a sense of distance, a high awareness of intellectual and business superiority. For the state we need, there should be a bureaucratic aristocracy that is no longer based on origin, education, and titles but solely on outstanding qualities. The awareness of this, the pride in masterful achievements that become the norm, and the feeling of entitlement to authority through the ability to exercise it, require an attitude that represents internal rank in external life. This layer should be socially leading in Germany, esteemed, and exemplary in every sense, including their ethos. This necessitates independence and a broad way of life, which must be secured through appropriate income. The subordinate mindset of high positions has been, until now, a consequence of the lack of financial freedom. If someone is accustomed to writing by hand for 20 years because they lack the funds to attend a two-minute oral discussion, their thinking will also be limited. This is how our entire administration has operated.

However, the sovereignty of the state, even in its highest representatives, should be surrounded by splendor. I believe it is not only right to grant an endowment—a castle with a title—at the end of a long and exceptionally successful career, but also to enable leaders to maintain a lifestyle during their career that is equivalent to that of great business leaders. This, given the constant interaction between administration and the private sector, also influences the success of business endeavors

Nurture – breeding or education?

It cannot be my intention at this point to present a draft of a future educational system. I hope to be able to do so thoroughly at a later time, perhaps not without practical reason. I have been closely involved in these questions myself for several years and believe I know the profound advantages and equally great weaknesses, especially of the existing system at that time. Since war and revolution have devastated and poisoned everything here as well - tradition, spirit, people, methods - I will briefly describe how I envision the construction, the rebuilding, for future times; how Germany must arrange itself in the future if it wants to send its young people into the world differently, more perceptively, and wiser than we were sent.

What was significant about the old school, especially the humanistic gymnasium, can be summed up in two words: Wilhelm von Humboldt and classicism. It embodied great qualities: a simple piety, high moral demands placed on individuals; a long and conscientious formal education that began with Latin and ended there. The habit of duty, diligence, truthfulness, and thoroughness was instilled early on and forever. There prevailed a stoic worldview, akin to what one read in Cicero, a disdain for comfort, and a contempt for small personal gains. However, this public school did put an end to the private tutoring of the 18th century, which, despite its shortcomings, took place in the midst of the world with a cheerful understanding of the world, its situations, and conditions. Since then, a somber seriousness permeated the classrooms and corridors, leading either to a burst of rebellion, bitter hatred, internal resistance, or resigned submission. The model was the monastery school, not the knightly education of the feudal era. The moral imperative was of a decidedly spiritual, not military, origin.

And this classicism was nothing but a refined, bloodless, bourgeois echo of the Renaissance, which increasingly lost itself in pedantic aestheticism and frosty formalism. The world of the schoolmaster, this enthusiastic drill sergeant of grammar, was the entire world. Whatever was happening outside drew the student's attention away from Horace and Livy. Moreover, this classicism was thoroughly hostile to history. Only timeless ancient questions were deemed worthy of being treated in Latin. Even in the case of Caesar, his usage of the

accusative with the infinitive was deemed more important than the conquest of Gaul itself. No contemporary events shed light, no contemporary thoughts, no great contemporaries. It was not Abraham Lincoln but Jugurtha, not the Panama Canal but the Appian Way that were mentioned. All books were written by schoolmasters, for the sake of learning. It was from the gymnasium that the political otherworldliness of the 19th century originated, which, through Plutarch, forgot about the American Civil War and knew Roman weapons better than the Japanese ambitions for world power. We were educated for everything imaginable, for theology, philology, and philosophy, but not for the dangers of the world situation that lurked all around us because the teachers themselves knew nothing about them. And, in the end, the school lost the concept of what education should be and what was known everywhere there was genuine education on a grand scale: in ancient Roman senatorial families, in the knightly circles of feudal times, in the 18th century, at Eton and Oxford in England, and even today in certain circles of Germany that are close to the great reality in terms of rank and profession: learning from facts and according to living examples, cultivation and discipline, knowledge and tact, scientific and social experience. The way of conducting oneself, of moving in public, of judging, of expressing oneself—these are not trivial matters. The true educator has a greater impact through who they are than what they say. This has always been the case in any good society. And no one ultimately values their own soul if they do not value their outward appearance. The eye learns faster and deeper than mere intellect. And finally, one's outward appearance also signifies a confidence in navigating the world on which our fate depends. The trained eye for facts, situations, and dangers gives true value to mere knowledge. It's first about character and then knowledge, but as a nation, we had no discipline and far too much education. We were stuffed with knowledge that had no relevance to life, tirelessly, aimlessly, by teachers who knew no other task. But scholarship is one thing, and wisdom, life experience, and worldly sophistication are another—and where were they?

The archetype of the teacher! We no longer have the old, long-outdated type, and the new one is yet to emerge. But something must exist—a model figure, a piece of significant and superior reality that captivates the student and draws them in. The revered master in a worn-out robe, his head full of Horace's verses, could inspire awe—but that was in a time when there were no cars and airplanes. Much is lost when, at a young age, one cannot inwardly respect their educators, when they feel superior to them and mock them. But a gifted boy yearns for the

reality of his own years, and he senses what it looks like. We need educators who have early exposure to the circles of great practice and feel at home in them, who know how to present themselves, who are socially mature, who know the world, engage in sports, and make the student feel personally closer to the realities of the time. Seminars and universities are no longer sufficient to prepare for this task, which is shaped by the student body of the time, their direction in life inherent to the time, and the slowly emerging ever-new goals and forms of life. It is necessary and sufficient to master a subject—to also be familiar with two or three others—but not exclusively in the lecture hall. We must free the teacher from monastic ideals if they are to free the student from them. We cannot watch as a talented individual is accustomed to scanning Homeric verses while the country is collapsing. Those who want to teach English should have worked for a year in an English company. It is there, and not through Shakespeare, that one learns about the English, their understanding of life, and their political thinking. And that is the purpose of serious English instruction: to gain an understanding of the character and present historical situation of this nation and its empire through the language. The best reading material is The Times, even linguistically, provided that the teacher has learned how to read between the lines. Anyone can read poets at home, and Shakespeare is too good to be dissected in a chorus to extract essay material.

Those who teach physics and chemistry should have spent some time in a steelworks because the younger generation must not only grasp the formulas but also develop an understanding of how German willpower and organizational skills have built an industry based on scholarly knowledge, without which half of our people could not survive. The names Borsig, Siemens, Krupp, and Ehrhardt should become an inner experience of their work. The significance of shipbuilding and shipping should emerge in broad outlines, as well as the future problem of coal development, the political importance of possessing iron ore deposits, and our ore losses due to the Treaty of Versailles. The idea of Stinnes, consolidating the industries that succeed in processing a product into one hand, to make the journey from raw material to finished product as simple and cheap as possible, should be understood. The significance of intensive agriculture as a chemical treatment of the soil should be emphasized. What did we know about all these things when the war broke out, when it broke out for the sake of these very things? Because it happened out of envy for achievements of which we learned nothing in school.

And those who study history, including Greek or Roman history, should thoroughly familiarize themselves with the diplomatic records of the last century and experience firsthand as a secretary at an embassy or consulate how history is made. They can then teach their students that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the school wisdom of our historians. The state examination can be replaced by a diplomatic examination in each subject. After all, one only learns the pedagogical craft from a living subject, and the diploma would provide the opportunity to transition into another profession (engineer, interpreter, private secretary) if someone realizes they have made a mistake with the first choice.

Then the purpose of higher education itself! Is it still aware of a clear mission, as in Humboldt's time, or is it disintegrating into a bundle of subjects pursued as ends in themselves with departmental patriotism? Should it merely assist the university with some preliminary work, or generate that superficial knowledge in all fields that we call education? Since the fading of humanistic ideals, one senses an anxious endeavor to prevent the student from doing, thinking, or feeling anything for themselves. The capacity for work is completely absorbed by instruction, every conceivable subject is pedagogically served before hunger for it arises; all books are schoolbooks; all permissible thinking should be educationally guided. But for what purpose? I believe that here the stratum should be cultivated that carries and leads Germany's future destinies—socially, intellectually, politically, economically—and the goal should be the qualities necessary for this today and for us: sagacity, foresight, perseverance, discipline, and above all personal independence. Whoever counts in any way in the European-American world today is, to an extent scarcely imagined, a self-taught person, and the Germans even more so than others. Even in school, we fashion from what we hear and see a silent personal lesson for our own needs, perhaps scarcely consciously; but that is precisely why higher education should stimulate, awaken, and present a wide range of possibilities to the truly gifted, rather than confining them to a rigid mold. But this requires free time, open libraries, the permission to choose certain class hours and topics within certain limits, student study clubs, and above all, the significant book, which has always been our greatest intermediary to reality, despite the best efforts of teachers.

But what kind of books are in the hands of our youth! Has anyone ever delved into the psychology of the German textbook? The world as study material, history as a memory exercise, life divided into paragraphs! Who has written all

these books? People who themselves only knew the subject from books. There is nothing more disconnected from reality, narrower, and shallower than the typical textbook, which today is the only one officially placed in the hands of students. Here, I suggest that extensive handbooks be created as supplements to these books, intended solely for private use by students and individuals who wish to educate themselves, all of whom can and should be treated to a much greater extent as adults than a born teacher usually can. These books should not be used for classroom instruction. They should include excellent references to literature and other hints to enable independent study in libraries and elsewhere, and they should be written by the best experts we possess. It should become the noble habit of leading personalities to record their entire experience in a good book for the youth at the height of their lives. A statesman should write the history of the last century from a global political perspective, with maps, statistics, and references to documents. A military leader should cover the history of warfare since Frederick the Great, a prominent industrialist or merchant should address the picture of the modern world economy, which will be the field for most of these students in one way or another. For English instruction, we need a portrayal of modern England and its colonial empire, along with its political and economic structure (this should have been written by Carl Peters). For Latin and Greek lessons, a history of ancient politics and culture is needed (perhaps by Eduard Meyer), as well as a penetrating depiction of German literature and the visual arts (perhaps by Dehio). We need a handbook of physics and its foundational principles, and a handbook of technology, especially its applications. This is the world in which every talented German should finally be their own teacher.

Three to four hours daily, strict, focused, with high demands - not everyone needs to have been there to achieve something later - and one free study day per week as an honor: that's what must be accomplished. In addition, two hours of sports and the rest of the time for self-education, which is everywhere the concern of a properly cultivated ambition. "Everything for everyone" is a senseless principle that is meant to obscure the lack of a real goal today.

And now, let's discuss the individual fields: Religion should either be addressed honestly, seriously, strongly, or not at all. An institution imbued with simple piety, as there were many in the past, yes – but young people should not be educated as literary figures through half-measures, "dogma-less moral instruction," "worldview teachings," or whatever else the replacement of religion

with feuilleton may be called.

I would put Latin at the center, even today. Germany owes more to the thorough teaching of Latin in its Gymnasien during the previous century than it realizes: its intellectual discipline, organizational talent, and technique. The mode of intellectual work acquired through years of daily, pedantic habit of thinking in the most disciplined language that exists has since become an inherited tradition that has had an impact in laboratories, workshops, and offices, even for those who did not receive this direct training in their professional tradition. Today, I consider this core element of our intellectual armor more indispensable than ever. It cannot be replaced by anything, not even the purely mechanical thinking process of mathematics. It has practically protected us from the consequences of the intellectual wanderings of Romanticism, and if it were abandoned today, it would plunge us from the heights of real achievements that sustain our lives, after which we have become a world nation. Whether someone is a good or bad Latinist is irrelevant. They must simply be compelled to participate for years.

Next is German: There is no other nation that speaks and writes its mother tongue so poorly. We have never possessed a high school of German style; we have no work on the art of writing well – Nietzsche could have given it to us, but who else? – and German teachers themselves generally do not understand it. If anything is to improve here, the German essay must first disappear, this educator towards trashy and pretentious literature, with the falseness of its structure, phrases, and conclusions, its treatment of subjects about which neither the student nor the teacher – if they have any sense – nor any other person can say anything sensible, but for which German literature is constantly milked again and again to provide a not yet exhausted theme. No, if we want to learn to write, spontaneously, clearly, deeply, thoroughly, we must express ourselves about something familiar to us: the simplest knowledge of physics and mathematics, the description of a historical event, the explanation of geographical or economic facts, and that daily, as a natural and effortless habit, without the inner inhibitions of a major event lasting several hours with a pile of blank paper on the table. No solemn disposition, but the casual writing in one go, without thinking about arrangement and word choice, because one has the subject in mind: that is the path to good, that is, natural style. No prattle about the characters of a drama or a moral maxim: a decent person is ashamed to lay bare their experiences and feelings and hides behind phrases. The essay is always a comedy for the one who writes it, first before the teacher, and finally before

oneself. But even here, a book on the art of good writing is necessary, written by a profound connoisseur, to let the student quietly sense what matters, despite school and newspaper, novel and feuilleton.

History education, or the political education of the people through schools: who would have understood in the past that they are one and the same? The best history teachers were learned, passionate, patriots, but completely detached from the real world and politically clueless. Essentially, they were all philologists or theologians. We sat beneath the collapsing tower and recited the Battle of Cannae, but our teachers themselves knew nothing about the American Civil War with its massive battles. If we had known about it, we would have assessed America's entry into the World War differently. In England and France, they understood the purpose of schooling better. History is not just a subject to be learned, nor a playground for benevolent feelings. What we need is a strong, daily, and profound education of national consciousness as a thoughtful attitude, but with the foundation of a depiction of recent history that ruthlessly refers to the actual facts – its powers and goals, its political, military, economic, and propaganda means, the geographical conditions of maritime trade and naval warfare, resource supply, and exports. And since a teacher, unless they are a genius, cannot know all of this – although they really should – we are left once again with the book, written by experts who have equipped it with every means to enable personal understanding of the issues. To know that all politics is power politics, that weakness means annihilation; to know that every individual must live, think, and act as an indispensable member of their nation with every breath; and to know where and how the major decisions of the past decades were prepared and the future ones will be prepared – that is what I call history education, which must be pursued rigorously, daily, for years, and which also places ancient and medieval history in comparative and real-political perspectives. Every school should have its debating clubs where the events of the day, financial policy, currency issues, and the potential consequences of political tensions and treaties are discussed.

In comparison, everything else is simple: the foreign languages through which one simultaneously understands the nations as they are in today's reality, and not how they appear in their literature; mathematics and physics, which should be pursued practically and within the scope of their current applications; botany and zoology, which can be left to the private study of those who are drawn to it, now that the fashion of Darwinism has ended; geography, which is only relevant to

the extent that it is connected to major politics and economics; philosophy, which should be kept away from young people in the form of the logical and psychological nonsense found in textbooks, so that their natural, non-literary philosophy has time to grow, namely as the certainty of standing on their own feet freely and proudly in the world, with a clear conscience, an unspoiled view of what is, and reverence for the mystery.

Finally, and above all, I want to demand one more thing to ensure the freedom of personality and the selection of all genuine talents through a practical arrangement: the separation of the final examination from the school.

In Germany, perhaps more than elsewhere, there are numerous splendid young people, intelligent, of noble lineage, honest, proud, made of the best material, who are not suited for the methodical school system. Under its pressure, they have been internally broken by the thousands, expelled as punishment, run away, gone to America, or disappeared into meager occupations because they had rebelled against the uniform compulsion through some foolishness and found no alternative path within our system of qualification. They were thus excluded from the hierarchy of examinations for higher professions, while bookworms and model students managed to make their way through all of them. But it is the former that matter. In times of need, Germany needs more of them than it does of good and bloodless mediocrity. The existing system excluded autodidacts, it excluded many who develop late in our race, those who are shy and limited at 15 years old but suddenly awaken at 25, and it finally excluded those whose parents were too poor to forgo income for years. If we are to talk about democracy, it must happen here. The school may issue character references because it possesses an opinion on the results of its training. But intellectual rank should be determined completely impartially, independent of all schools, through a national examination. Everyone should be allowed to participate in this examination, regardless of age, gender, position, or previous education. No worker should be able to complain about the educational privileges of the privileged, for if he possesses persistent diligence, he can appear at the same examination table with the same prospects. No father would need to keep his sons in grammar school at all costs, for the path to the final examination would lead through offices and workshops without time limits in the future. The examination should take place several times a year throughout the entire empire and on the same days everywhere, perhaps in town halls, with exactly the same tasks carefully developed and printed by a separate commission according to

broad principles. The individual questionnaires are worked on for six days, with a one-week interval, each lasting about three hours and entirely in writing. They consist of one or two presentations and the concise answering of questions that require skill rather than learned knowledge. The tasks are divided into numerous extensive groups, allowing personal selection based on aptitude and intention within fixed limits, and a minimum number of them must be correctly addressed. The number of examination days and questions, as well as their diversity, eliminate chance. The grading is done without knowledge of the name and place of examination according to carefully established rules, for which older students and prospective teachers are available enough. The result, which also continually and publicly evaluates the schools and types of schools as well as private education based on their achievements, is a diploma with a title, such as the earlier Licentiate or Bachelor, thus a doctoral degree of lower rank that can be achieved by anyone genuinely capable with the corresponding investment of diligence and effort, and that could provide a completely objective selection of Germany's talents. That, to me, seems to be the true meaning of the term "final examination."

Finally, I have the wish for a German Eton, for several schools of the highest cultivation for exceptionally gifted individuals. Why couldn't such schools be established at places like Schulpforta, the Tübinger Stift, the Johanneum in Hamburg, the Francke Foundations in Halle, or Kloster Ettal, with extensive facilities for every imaginable type of study: a place of solitude and freedom, with ample opportunities for sports and visits from famous men who would gladly spend a few days there to assess the growing youth's potential tasks and engage in conversations about what the world will demand of them one day?

Rights as a result of duties

In law, the worldview of a people, its soul, should be expressed purely and unclouded. Law is the intended external form of existence, as it unfolds within the bounds of a historically dynamic entity, a nation, a state. But this external form is always, if it is to be genuine, the result not only of historical development but above all of the inner nature of this existence, that is, the character of a nation. The Roman needs a different law than the Athenian, the German needs a different law than the Englishman. A universally correct law exists only in the minds of lifeless scholars and dreamers.

Therefore, the source of every living law must be life itself, and the prerequisite for the legislator to capture it unclouded and completely in commandments and prohibitions is a life experience acquired through personal activity in the grand circumstances of present society, economy, and politics. The Roman praetor did not study Greek or Egyptian law. He understood himself as an official, military leader, and financier in all the circumstances of the Roman world surrounding him. In this lies, for us, not the exemplary nature of Roman law itself, but of its origin.

It was a calamity for the German people that the ancient Germanic laws, which had developed and evolved through custom and tradition since the migration of peoples, were replaced and destroyed by Roman jurisprudence since 1495. In England, the continuously developed Norman law still holds sway today. The French Code civil, created under the leadership of Napoleon, is based not only on his immense understanding of human nature and practical experience in all areas of administration and finance, but also on the experiences of his collaborators who had undergone an extraordinary education through the people and events of the Revolution. Only present-day Germany possesses a law whose true source of experience is not contemporary life, or life at all, but a Latin book. It possesses a training of judges that is based not on early practice but on scholarly theory, built on the habituation to ever finer divisions and connections of abstract concepts. Formal exercise replaces understanding of human nature and worldly experience. "Today's German legal science is to a very significant extent an inheritance of the scholasticism of the Middle Ages. A theoretical

contemplation of the fundamental values of our real life has not yet begun. We do not even know these values." With the founding of the German Empire, this situation has not improved but worsened. Both the Civil Code and the Criminal Code were created exclusively by legal scholars and professional judges. In both works, the Roman division of legal material into legal concepts prevails, without exception.

t has bitterly avenged us that instead of receiving the Roman praetor as a model, we received Roman law itself. In place of creative legislative development, there emerged a bitter struggle of life against the book and the letter, a struggle that only slowly and always too late forced concessions from lawmakers. If we encounter deep aversion towards "authority," the "court," and even the state in Germany, as if they were something foreign and hostile, it is primarily because our entire social and economic life has been forcibly organized according to principles that are completely alien to it, and it is supervised by a bureaucratic class educated purely formally and theoretically in the same law. Even the hatred against "capital," to which Marxism owes its success in Germany, has one of its reasons in the fact that the entire economic legislation has been subjected to the – for us – shallow and brutal concept of Roman property instead of the concept of Germanic ownership.

Every evolved law is the result of duties. It has always been so everywhere, and the deep moral force of genuine legal concepts lies in their secret metaphysics, where the life rhythm of a race beats. What we Germans lack – and the English did not lack – is the long silent education of the people through their own law, born from their blood, growing and maturing with them. Even Roman law was based on duties, namely the strict duties of the Roman citizen towards the citizenship, which would appear to us, with our different disposition, as unbearable slavery. The English-Norman law was based on the willingness of the nobility to sacrifice life and property at any time for the ruler, who in turn treated them as the first among equals. This is the origin of the modern pride of the individual Englishman, the idea of English freedom, the "my home is my castle" notion. Everywhere, it is duties that generate rights. Today's German law lacks this idea, just as it lacks all ideas. Instead of deeply felt duties, it contains a penal code.

Roman law has corrupted us. It dangerously appealed to the inclinations of the German "Michel" to dream, to wander, to accept everything as it is. The pitiful past, the bundle of dwarf states and provincial fatherlands where there were no

worthwhile tasks, and hardly any stance other than that of servants – this entire decaying world of dusty Gothic has shattered our pride. For the pride of a nation is based on its law.

On this foundation grew the soulless Roman law of the German nation. Let us not forget that the part of the Corpus Juris in question, the Pandects, originated from the official activity of the praetor peregrinus, not the much more respected praetor urbanus. The latter dealt with his fellow Romans, Roman citizens, while the former dealt with foreigners, mere objects of Roman power. During the imperial era, all peoples were objects of this power, and this "law of nations" (jus gentium) was commented upon by learned jurists in the East since 200 AD. These commentaries were collected, extracted, and reinterpreted based on oriental perspectives. Thus, the Pandects were created for Byzantium, for an oriental ruler who only knew submission – Islam means submission – but not the law of personality and free will. Rome itself was then under the control of Germans.

But the idea of freedom lies at the core of Germanic life. It desires to be free from all constraints that resist its inner form and its outward effects. The Germanic person feels free in relation to the entire world, as an individual, as a man, each for themselves, just as they stand alone before their God as a devout Christian, praying or repenting. This Nordic sense of life spread across Western Europe during the migration period with the Saxons, Goths, Franks, and Normans, and from them emerged the archetype of all present-day peoples of the Western world, with the era of knights and the Crusades. It not only gave rise to the fundamental problem of Gothic contemplation, that of free will, but also to the dense array of figures who had resolved it through their appearance, from the Vikings and the Hohenstaufen emperors to the leaders of the Renaissance, the trappers of America, and the inventors and organizers of our days. And when the German served in humble obedience as a knight of an order, as in the German East and in the struggle against the Spanish Moors, they willingly sacrificed their rights for a higher cause. To embrace this duty in inner freedom is their highest right. Upon it rests the proud ideals of Gothic loyalty, officer duty, and the old Prussian civil service. This soulful freedom is foreign and unknown to the Pandects. It only knows the obligation, the claim to the performance of another.

From freedom arise the Germanic ideas of family and state, two spheres of the interconnection between rights and duties that are only conceivable together as a

living whole. One may call them private and public law: their connection lies in the fact that the family ensures the continuity of this life through generational succession, while the state protects it politically and maintains it economically.

According to this, the law regulates the circumstances of actual life. The bearer of this order, for us, is the free human will - not proven philosophically as free, but treated legally as free - which can be directed towards actions, situations, creations, or another person's will. In relation to it, there are no physical persons and physical things in the sense of Roman law, but rather starting points and goals - subjects and objects - of its actions. The individual, the family, the social class, the recognized association, and ultimately the nation, which acts and decides through the representatives of its sovereign rights, serve as the starting points and subjects of a free act of will. The objects - means or goals of actions and characteristics of situations or things - include honor, freedom, security, and property. Property is not considered a mere thing, but, for us, a quality with respect to a will that can adhere to thoughts and relationships as well as to bodies. The concept of intellectual property was completely foreign to the Romans.

Every right corresponds to a duty. A duty - towards the individual, the family, the association, or the nation - is a right insofar as it is not received but given. The exercise of a right gives rise to the expectation of the fulfillment of the corresponding duty by another. The commission of a wrong cancels this expectation.

Thus, the essence of punishment is based on the fact that every violation of duty results in a curtailment of rights, specifically honor, freedom, and property.

Therefore, civil and criminal law should be constructed in a similar manner. They relate to right and wrong, the establishment and protection of the same conditions. In the legal codes of Germany, they are worlds apart. One book imitates the Roman institutions and pandects, including the now impossible distribution of contractual relationships into property and obligation law. The other, for which there was no Latin model, has been painstakingly compiled without the idea of a deeper order, as can be seen from the sequence of chapters. Consequently, the judicial process reveals a dualistic practice, depending on whether the judges are accustomed to thinking as Romanists or criminalists.

English law is deeply permeated by the connection between rights and wrongs, as well as their division into private or public rights and wrongs. A future

German law should establish, based on the same Germanic sense, when an individual will contradicts the general will, i.e., when private interests are separated from public interests. Furthermore, it should determine when punishment, as mentioned before, as a curtailment of rights resulting from the violation of duties, should be imposed based on the general will rather than individual will. In England, which recognizes only society instead of the state, public wrongs such as murder are at least formally prosecuted in private proceedings by the person who discovers them. There is no prosecutor. In Germany, however, the collective will of the nation is vested in the state, and a deeper understanding of this fact should demand something that is entirely foreign to Roman thinking: that every individual is obliged to report crimes not only against individuals but also against the nation, regardless of their personal relationship to the perpetrator, and that the violation of this duty, even through mere silence and not just complicity, results in a severe curtailment of one's own honor, freedom, and property. The general duty to report, including the liability of the seller for the lawful origin of the sold goods, would significantly reduce the number of crimes. Every offender and unlawful possessor would be noticed by someone. Existing law allows for reporting and occasionally rewards it, but it does not treat it as a moral obligation. Consequently, in many circles, reporting carries a stigma, akin to denunciation, while it would have been possible to develop individuals' legal consciousness to the point where they feel they have assumed a part of state sovereignty upon learning about a criminal act and act under the impression of the associated responsibility. Here, it becomes evident that the "Roman" law transformed in the Orient only recognizes the individual as an object of legal creation and adjudication, not as a participant and bearer of public order, thereby tragically shaping them to consider themselves solely as objects and not as members of the state.

And in another way, the spirit of servitude of this soulless law for the Germanic sense of the world is revealed. It denies the claim of the free man to protect himself, his honor, safety, property, and those of his people and homeland, using all available means. It conceals the non-recognition of personal pride, even national pride, the sense of honor, self-respect, and inner independence of the individual behind the pitiful concept of self-defense. "An act commanded by self-defense is not unlawful," says the Civil Code, but an undertone is heard suggesting that even this is undesirable and always suspicious of exceeding limits. From this standpoint, the criminal act is formally equated with any other. The perpetrator and the resisting victim are equally mere objects of adjudication.

But, on the contrary, it should be elevated as a principle: the criminal is without rights while committing the crime and during escape. Wrong cannot be done against the one who is currently doing wrong. It is only with the arrest that the state assumes further exercise of public law. This is the implicit foundation of the Germanic view, which is so self-evident in England and America, where Norman law has shaped practical customs, that it does not need to be expressly stated. Similarly, in our society, the free man should be allowed and, under certain circumstances, required to act on behalf of the state when it is temporarily unable to do so. Anyone who kills or injures a person whom they unquestionably encounter in the preparation or commission of a crime or while fleeing after its completion—such as in the case of burglary, robbery, murder, adultery, rape, or arson—will not be punished. Anyone who forcefully enters another's property to destroy or steal something becomes an outlaw. Anyone called upon by a third party in cases of urgent danger to life and property may use any means they deem appropriate. The same should apply to attacks against the security of the nation: anyone who becomes aware of a crime or attempt of treason against the country through espionage or collaboration with the enemy should not only be obliged to report and personally accuse but also be entitled to intervene personally in any form. The criminal would know under what conditions they are acting, and thus, volenti non fit injuria (to the willing, no injury is done).

At the forefront of law for a people conscious of their dignity should stand honor. It is the most precious thing that an individual, man or woman, a family, a social class, or a nation has to lose and defend. One who does not feel this is already dishonorable. Anyone who tolerates an infringement upon honor, whether personal or that of their social class and people, has none to lose. A legal code that does not allow for the personal protection of honor perceives the meaning of life solely in material conditions and thereby lacks inner dignity.

But there is not only personal honor, but also business honor. A honorable trait is even more indispensable to the commercial life of an entire nation than to an individual merchant's house, where dishonorable business conduct has always resulted in the rupture of personal relationships. The emergence of non-locally bound financial assets, which do not consist of productive enterprises but are merely invested in them, and the recent redistribution of wealth due to war, revolution, and inflation have led to a terrible degeneration of economic life and a ruthless pursuit of profit devoid of all tradition, without a sense of honor, even

without fear of imprisonment. Precisely for this reason, dishonorable actions such as fraud, usury, extortion, bribery, forgery of documents and objects should, in addition to severe monetary and custodial sentences, result in exclusion from anything that requires trust: from the stock exchange, from seats on supervisory boards and directorates, as well as the non-recognition of one's signature, the inability to issue bills and checks, and, under certain circumstances, a declaration of incapacity to engage in commercial transactions altogether, with permanent supervision by the police.

Freedom and security can be of a private nature: rights and wrongs concerning the individual and the family, or of a public nature: protection and endangerment of life within the state and the economy. The former includes the sanctity of the home as that part of the nation's living space in which the individual will is completely free and should be protected from any intrusion. Only the criminal loses this basic right in Nordic peoples, who live in protected spaces. Furthermore, it includes the protection of life from deprivation of liberty, murder, assault, and moral offenses. The latter includes the right of marriage, in which the Germanic idea of the family is reflected, and thus also the rights of children, as well as the violation of this idea through adultery. To the freedom and security of the state belong press laws, censorship, and protection against treason; to economic freedom and security, above all, the right to one's own will directed towards work, thus both the right to refuse work when no contract is breached and the right not to participate in it, even for leaders of the economy, where refusal means the closure of the enterprises. The existing Roman - materialistic - law actually only knows "labor" as the accomplished, a sort of material quantum, a mere thing. However, it depends on the act of working as the manifestation of a will and as a source of accomplishments. A future labor law and likewise a commercial law should be clearly based on the fact of free will and not on the existence of its material result. The former is the Germanic standpoint, while the latter is the Roman standpoint.

At the forefront of the right to property should stand the right of inheritance. The Germanic concept of property cannot be separated from the Germanic idea of the family, which is based on succession through generations. If we define property as that which is exclusively subject to one's own will – not just "things" as in Roman law and our Civil Code, but also all goals, means, and results of volitional actions, business, technical, artistic, organizational ideas, and abilities – then the will that connects property with generational succession through the

right of inheritance is the first one to be protected. Without this, possession descends to mere lending. Theft in the broadest sense, as a violation concerning property, should include not only fraud and usury but also the misuse of others' talents for one's own purposes and the appropriation of inventions, thoughts, motives, and intentions.

Regarding punishments – I repeat: the curtailment of rights as a result of the violation of duties – they must be real punishments in relation to contemporary sensibilities. The reduction of property through fines should not be specified in fixed amounts to be just, but rather in percentages of income or assets; thus, they must be imposed by the judge but executed by the tax authorities. Imprisonment, for the same reason, must have not only a humiliating but also a deterrent effect. Mere confinement with adequate provisions, which often exceeds the standard of living of the middle class, is no longer perceived as punishment in some circles. Lengthy and hard labor, simplification of meals, and solitary confinement should be regular additional penalties. As for honor punishments, the public display of the name, along with the address and reason for the punishment, should be applied, especially in cases of violations against business honor.

The German Currency

Altough the "Rentenmark peace" may make it seem unnecessary today to seriously consider currency issues, it still seems necessary to review the history of the German mark's struggle for survival once again. The Rentenmark was intended as a temporary solution and nothing more, and the resolution of the unsolvable reparations question will once again pose the problem of our future currency, and in the most serious form.

The History of the Papiermark (paper mark) is inseparable from the history of parliamentary government during our directorial era. The ignorance of its responsible representatives, the characteristic materialism with which the currency was seen as a technical specialized problem, the cowardice and dishonesty in individual measures or the lack thereof, led to a situation where things were allowed to reach alarming states before sudden fear prompted intervention, without anyone having understood the deeper meaning of the catastrophe beforehand. As a result of years of lacking a genuine standard of value and trustworthy means of payment, the economy was thrown into such confusion that it failed to present an accurate picture of its situation to both hostile powers and itself. The apparent prosperity, as expressed, for example, in fantastic dividend figures that amounted to nothing, deceived foreign countries in a terrible way about our solvency and boundless impoverishment, and deceived the domestic population about the depletion of resources and the necessity to work harder. The productive economy is now so undermined that it could no longer bear new currency experiments. Since around 1920, buying and selling with "money" had the character of inevitable fraud, and yet industry and agriculture, oblivious to the sinking exchange rate, treated it with the ignorance of laymen and often saw it as a means of salvation rather than one of the most effective causes of decay. The government condemned the paper mark, its own currency, to death by allowing the issuance of the first "stable" bond, which abandoned the old standard of value without anyone noticing the connection, let alone working towards the necessity of a quick replacement. The currency continued to be treated as a secondary issue, one that could be postponed until the resolution of the reparations question and beyond.

As early as the summer of 1923, I had warned on several occasions and

identified the currency question as the most urgent of all. I foresaw that the government of the Ruhr resistance would perish along with the currency collapse, through the disruption of the internal situation, which became psychologically unsustainable with the daily fearful and provocative calculations involving ever-increasing gigantic figures. Instead of recognizing the necessity for increased labor, which had become evident since the introduction of the Rentenmark, there was a cry, in senseless terror, for a reduction in the already cheapest prices in the world. When dealing with numbers exceeding three digits, most people, including the educated, find it impossible to keep track of their modest household and accurately estimate prices. While foreign countries were buying us out, the domestic market oscillated between nervous frugality and hasty spending. The "housing Bolshevism," that is, the forced imposition of penny rents, which appeared oppressive due to their long series of digits and yet did not allow for the slightest improvement, caused the housing stock, one of the most valuable remnants of our national assets, to decay. It brought the construction industry to a standstill, which had previously supported almost a tenth of the workforce along with related industries before the war and could have prevented unemployment, with its tremendous burden on public finances, almost entirely. It further burdened the finances through the loss of taxes from these industries and property owners and created such a combination of filth, hatred, vulgarity, and obtuseness towards all external - and thus internal - culture, that all of this had a worse effect than a second war. The extent of the mental and material damage suffered during these months cannot yet be fully assessed.

Added to this was the crime of foreign exchange policy, where, like a child hiding the broken cup, attempts were made to conceal the consequences of the mark's demise. As long as foreign exchange and paper marks were mixed in the payment transactions and the exchange rate was seen at least as a possibility, some of the trust enjoyed by foreign currencies also applied to the mark. It was only when they were artificially separated that, in the general perception, an absolutely valuable currency, which was driven into obscurity, faced an absolutely worthless one. It was then that the mark lost its last anchor. The available means of payment became the subject of a daily gamble, permanently losing their ability to measure value. The foreign exchange market, which now thrived even more, poisoned the entire flow of goods. On the contrary, a number of foreign currencies should have been allowed as legal tender and it should have been permissible for foreigners in the country to demand payment in

foreign currencies. At that time, they would have flowed into the country in large numbers, brought a solid element into the payment system, and made the transition to a stable currency shorter and smoother. Instead, the value of the mark sank to microscopic amounts, and under the Stresemann cabinet, in the glorious final stretch from a million to a billion, a world record in depreciation speed was set that is unlikely to be surpassed. The culmination of this tactic was the official abuse of the Berlin dollar exchange rate, which was arbitrarily manipulated in relation to the foreign exchange rate in order to keep price figures low according to the cost of living index. However, in doing so, it made the last point of reference, the gold price, the subject of an entirely new speculation for weeks on end.

Meanwhile, since the state failed, public opinion hardly intervened consciously and created the slogan of a stable currency, which developed into a fixed idea and finally led to the emergence of various currencies based on commodities such as potassium, coal, grain, and electricity. These currencies were psychologically stabilized through the superstition that one could create a medium of exchange by mere comparison. However, the intervention of private sectors as such was based on a correct sense, which led to Helfferich's plan for a grain-based currency and ultimately to the creation of the Rentenmark. The underlying concept itself has still not been clearly understood, perhaps not even by its originators. It involves the state's renunciation of creating means of payment in favor of the private economy. Today, Germany is the only country in the world that has a purely private currency. The Rentenmark notes are claims on immovable productive assets and therefore formally similar to mortgages rather than promissory notes.

However, the introduction of the new means of payment entailed a dual task: to grasp the idea correctly and tactically execute the transition in the face of terrible distrust in all currency experiments supported by the state. This second and more difficult task, which required acrobatic skill and initially seemed almost hopeless, was surprisingly accomplished by Dr. Schacht. But it struggled and still struggles today against a new danger: By shutting down the printing presses, an important source of revenue for the state has been blocked, and it was foreseeable that the state would have to try to find some kind of replacement. Now, every currency is within a state, even if it is not the currency of the state, and it was more exposed to the state's encroachments here, as it was, so to speak, foreign credit being subjected to pressure. This danger is only seemingly

eliminated by the powers granted to the Currency Commissioner. In certain cases, he must decide whether to prioritize the state budget or the technical security of the currency. It might have been possible to have the Rentenmark guaranteed by an Anglo-American banking group, with the transfer of mortgage-based security, which would provide a very effective right to object to covert interventions in the currency situation. There are several types of inflation, such as discounting treasury bills payable in Rentenmarks at private banks, or the minting of metal coins without intrinsic value that exploits the credit of the Rentenmark for its own benefit, and there are several ways to attack a backing. The value of a mortgage depends on the yield of the encumbered asset, not on the material but on its performance. If tax laws destroy the yield, the value of the registered debt becomes questionable. Taxes themselves are, in a way, short-term mortgages with immediate termination, always ranking first as they must be paid out.

One must clarify the relationship between currency and "money" here. "Money" is a pure quantitative value that is imagined by disregarding the material nature of the commodity and the medium of exchange in a transaction. It is expressed simply by a numerical figure, and the Mark is, like the meter, only the scale by which the figure is determined. When a businessman today exchanges a used machine for raw materials, he mentally subtracts the abstract value that he measures and compares in Marks from the objects involved. This habit of "thinking in terms of money" does not necessarily require the existence of a medium of exchange in commercial transactions that contains the measured value as a material value. The metal weights we call coins have been increasingly replaced by documents (banknotes), and these in turn by entries in non-cash payments, rendering them completely unnecessary. The trust that enables this written exchange of values is based solely on the fact that the unit of value is a fixed quantity, and this is constantly called into question by the fact that the production of means of payment is not based on demand but serves as a source of income. In ancient Egypt, despite the highly developed credit system, there was no medium of exchange at all, only fixed measurements in written accounting, making the concept of a currency crisis unthinkable. However, for us, the relationship between currency and politics is more consequential than the relationship between currency and economy. In transactions between buyers and sellers, the medium of exchange appears as a transitional and normal commodity of a special kind, the production of which is a prerogative of governments everywhere, and therefore its quantity is determined by the state's monetary

needs. When this becomes excessive, it is referred to as inflation. Its original form is coin debasement, which has sometimes been taken to such an extreme by financially needy states that silver coins contained hardly any traces of silver. Thus, it was the deterioration and counterfeiting of a commodity that the manufacturer forced the buyer to accept as fully valuable.

Here, a significant turning point occurred in the last decade of the 18th century, in connection with the rapid spread, discussed elsewhere, of the separation of movable assets from productive values, namely through shares. Just as the ownership of a factory is separated in the form of a paper document, the specific value is also separated from the corresponding deposited coin with the banknote. Both shares and banknotes can now circulate from hand to hand without the transient owner being able to verify the existence of backing. Thus, the medium of exchange transitions from being a commodity to a bill of exchange issued against a treasure that is supposedly or actually somewhere. However, in the case of paper money, the issuance of the bill of exchange by the state is an ever-open source of income, with redemption being deferred indefinitely and the issuer being the sole judge of good faith. As these bills of exchange can be produced in unlimited quantities, to a far greater extent than debased coins, and as the unit of value is both attached to them and represented by them, the currency is subject to fluctuations in the exchange rate, as exemplified by the infamous assignats. Therefore, the currency policy of credit-insolvent states essentially consisted of forcefully maintaining the exchange rate without eliminating the cause of its decline, which initially lay in the excessive production of banknotes, but not solely.

As the first factor is overestimated by the prevailing materialistic understanding of the problem today, the "gold standard" that has been recommended as a panacea since Adam Smith must be examined in terms of its true significance. There is no such thing as a gold standard in the sense that is commonly assumed today. The circulation of banknotes is supposed to be backed by a gold reserve, but the word "backing" has a double meaning. Nowadays, it is understood as material security. However, if a country is capable of backing its paper money with anything at all, then instead of gold, a portfolio of commercial bills, a mortgage, or even the mere guarantee declaration of the government can take its place. But if that is not sufficient, a gold reserve alone will also be unable to secure the value of the banknotes. If material backing alone were the determining factor, then the assignats of the French Revolution and the German

papiermark would have been the two most solidly backed papers in the world. However, prior to the war, the Russian government failed to maintain the paper ruble at the gold exchange rate, despite having one of the largest gold reserves in the world. Conversely, no one would doubt that the pound note would not have fallen by a penny if the British government had abandoned the much smaller gold reserve and replaced it with a guarantee through legislation. Here, moral backing determines the trust placed in material backing, making the latter actually unnecessary. No country is so poor that it cannot secure its paper currency circulation through the provision of its national assets. However, the question is whether the government is determined to do so at any cost, for the sake of honor, or whether it is inclined to undermine material backing, which no one can prevent as it has no judge above it. This may be done either to conceal the consequences of wretched financial management, to pursue political goals, or out of a lack of courage to implement unpopular measures. The moral backing for the assignats was provided by the Jacobins and the Directory, and for the papiermark by the socialists and their associated party cliques. The exchange rate of both papers reflects the public judgment of the value of this backing. In Germany, these circles abandoned subjecting their own moral credit to further scrutiny with the introduction of the Rentenmark as a private currency. In France, they dared to do so until their downfall by Napoleon.

In this period, they conducted all financial experiments that occur to men without expertise, foresight, and sincerity in desperate situations, which we have witnessed since 1919 in almost the same sequence. This includes a series of compulsory loans, from the first one recommended by Mirabeau to the last one immediately discontinued by Napoleon after his coup. Other forms of extracting parts of wealth under the names of premium loans and income tax, with the latter naively determined to deliver income exceeding a certain amount. Then came the products of blind fear: the repeated closure of the stock exchange since July 27, 1793, and a foreign exchange regulation, which at that time meant the confiscation of coins, foreign currencies, and precious metals, as well as the prohibition of trading with them. Violations were punishable by death, which naturally had no effect. Then followed hasty austerity measures: the conversion of salaries paid in assignats to fractions of peace rates (1795), introduced simultaneously with an attempt to revalue mortgages and provide inadequate support to small annuitants. This was followed by a reduction in the number of government officials, naturally sparing the ranks of the Jacobins, who had found refuge in higher positions en masse. As a result of growing currency devaluation,

well-known measures were taken with well-known fates: the proposal for a currency bank, and thus a privately issued currency based on the credit of the economy, originating from industrial and commercial circles, was rejected in March 1796 on the grounds that it would undermine the authority of the state, i.e., the ruling party. At the same time, the proposal for a wheat currency was rejected for the same reason. Instead, the panacea of limited revolutionaries, with their customary disregard for the property of others, was repeatedly brought forward: the compulsory economy introduced on July 26, 1793, with the official fixing of prices, futile threats of punishment, the flourishing of black market activities, and the queues of urban population in front of empty bakeries. All of this received great applause from financiers who profited handsomely from it. Suppliers and companies prospered everywhere and allied themselves with the Jacobins in influential positions, aiming to become wealthy. Napoleon had to wage a very cautious war against one of these companies, Hirsch & Baer (Cerf-Berr), which exploited the army in Italy, as the ruling Director Barras was involved. This was followed by the introduction of a new currency with the minting of franc coins, which immediately disappeared from circulation. The printing press for banknotes was ceremoniously shut down in February 1796. Rescriptions, a type of treasury bill, were issued to meet the government's most urgent need for money. As a replacement for the assignats, mandates were issued, which were materially backed by the provision of confiscated property belonging to the nobility and the church. However, in the midst of this second terrifying period of the Revolution, the moral security that the material backing was not being secretly attacked was once again provided by the Jacobins. The level of trust in their honesty was reflected in the fact that the mandates, unlike the Rentenmark, a purely state currency, plummeted to half their value within the first week and ultimately became worthless within three months. Consequently, large parts of France switched to barter and natural exchange, and without foreign currencies, there was nothing valuable left. From then on, there was only one way to restore confidence in the currency, namely the abdication of the Jacobins and their followers. Since they themselves did not decide to support the franc, Napoleon eventually took over. After the 18th Brumaire, the exchange rate tripled within a few days.

However, the German and French directorial periods differ in that the French saw the honor of France in the conquest of foreign lands, which the victorious armies had to feed, while the German period had to witness the enemy's conquests on its own soil and provide for the enemy's armies for this purpose.

Consequently, the depreciation of the currency in the summer of 1922 and the autumn of 1923 had a pace that corresponded to this difference and would have continued accordingly with the expert conference and its results if the possibility of symbolic expression had not been taken away by the abolition of the state currency.

As the private Rentenmark gained confidence as an interim solution, the general opinion was that it could only be a transition to a new national currency. It is difficult to understand anything else by this than a form created by the state at its own discretion and for which it negotiates on an equal footing with foreign creditors, if necessary and possible. In the meantime, it was puzzling that the clear ultimate goal was increasingly obscured from public view by a bewildering series of banking projects that were conjured up and then disappeared. Alongside banks that remained mere concepts, the Golddiskontbank emerged as a grandiose term for something that would previously have been called a small foreign loan - perhaps in the amount of four weeks' worth of the required reparation payments. But then the question took a surprising turn, namely by shifting the stage from Berlin to Paris and entangling the future currency in the reparations plan. Was this accidental or planned? Did it originate from the German side, was it approved, fought against, or simply not understood? The fact is that the private currency was to be replaced by a state currency, but in a completely non-binding form determined by foreign and hostile states, thereby hanging the sword of a constantly looming currency crisis over the German people who are supposed to fulfill the reparation demands but cannot.

German experts were involved in the negotiations, which were led by directors of the Morgan Trust as representatives of America. Who sent them? Were they informed about the Parisian intentions and Morgan's interests? Did they exert any influence? Was there an influence from certain non-official circles? It should not be forgotten that the arrival of foreign experts in Berlin was greeted by our financial and French press as a triumph of the victors.

Then came the eagerness to inform them, the noisy optimism in official statements, but also the increasing secrecy about what was not a secret in Paris. Did they know nothing? Did they know but couldn't prevent it, or did they not want to prevent it? Finally, the result came to light. It was hastily published, with the most burdensome parts concealed, and was met with emphatic approval by the informed press, thus creating the appearance of approval by the German people, who in reality had no idea of the significance of the provisions and

mostly did not even know them, and presented this as a fact to the outside world. In any other country, the Constitutional Court would find an opportunity to thoroughly investigate these events. Did the responsible circles contribute to the result? In what direction? With what success? If without success, how can the silence and the attitude during and after the conclusion be justified? And if without foresight of the results and their consequences, when will the holders of very responsible positions, if they insist on holding onto them despite obvious lack of suitability and constant failures, become accountable for it?

The fact is that the entire wealth of the Reich is being surrendered; that the essential sources of income, which burden the impoverished economy and still do not even cover the necessary state expenditures, are being surrendered without indicating where a replacement will come from; that productive immovable assets, especially industry, are being surrendered - agriculture, without a doubt, was treated more cautiously, perhaps out of consideration for the sentiment of rural voters: All of this to the sheer delight of mobile financial capital, both German and foreign, which sees the possibility of enormous profits through the exploitation of this immense collateral mass by a giant trust that has already been established in the draft. The American oil scandal and the French reconstruction scandal set the example. What influence did these financial circles and Morgan have on the negotiations? To what extent was there prior agreement on linking the collateral with international credit transactions? Finally, the Reichsbank, founded by Frederick the Great, the old Prussian state bank, is being surrendered, including the Rentenbank and Golddiskontbank, to become a reparations bank operated by foreign trusts in Germany, which will have complete control over credit and currency.

All of this is happening as the final act of foreign policy by a party clique, whose right wing is here completing what the left wing began in Versailles: the sale of an entire nation into slavery, after mentally disarming it through mismanagement for five years and deceiving it about its fate through the noise of party politics. Only chiefs of Negro tribes have acted in this way until now - not even they, because they made sure that the opposing side assumed obligations, while they repeatedly endured with a smile that such obligations were not given or not kept, without losing their own self-confidence.

If the rule of this clique does not come to an end, the question of the German currency would become irrelevant to us. The measure of value for a sold commodity only concerns the buyer. However, I assume that for the majority of

the people, it is finally enough of the disgrace, and on the other hand, due to global political developments, the boundless problem of reaching an agreement on the loot is increasingly being drawn into the major unresolved power issues. Therefore, I repeat: the security and confidence in a future German currency are only indirectly dependent on the economic situation, namely on an active balance of trade, the inflow of foreign exchange, meeting the capital needs of industry and agriculture, and tax revenue, while all of this directly depends on major politics. If it fails, the economy disintegrates, and the currency becomes a problem. If it fulfills its task, both aspects are already supported. However, politics does not depend on institutions but on personalities. And ultimately, there is only personal credit for the economic system of an entire nation, just as for every individual enterprise. Therefore, at the deepest level, every currency rests on the personal credit of the responsible minority of rulers. The value of assignats was quite independent of military successes and the improvement or deterioration of the economic situation. Its curve shows two moments of the strongest decline: the convening of the legislative assembly, when it became clear that it contained only talkers, not leaders, and the formation of the Directory, whose practical and moral qualities were rightly evaluated; and three moments of sudden increase: temporarily in autumn 1792, when Danton seized dictatorship, in spring 1793 with the dictatorship of Robespierre, and permanently in autumn 1799 with Napoleon's coup d'état, which doubled the exchange rate within three days.

Against Tax Bolshevism

Taxes are almost the only area that has never been approached from a higher perspective. It seems that this is the most mundane aspect, merely involving money inflows that are removed from business life, regardless of how or where. Financial science limits itself to the process itself and its techniques - and yet there is a philosophy of taxation; one just needs to know how to perceive it.

The problem has both a moral and a practical side. As long as it is exclusively treated as the task of an office or partisan tactics, focusing only on the amount needed or the selection of victims, both aspects fall short. Economic life and a sense of duty are equally threatened, ultimately defeating the practical purpose. In all countries of the world, the net yield of taxes is not proportional to the cost of collection, the bitterness, and the harm caused to economic and social life.

Taxes are the amount by which the individual's standard of living is reduced in order to obtain the means for the collective's standard of living. The more responsibilities for protecting honor, security, and property rights (justice), life opportunities (major politics, war), and the prerequisites for economic prosperity (transport, order) that the collective assumes because individuals cannot or do not want to bear them individually, the greater the portion from the individual's household that must be transferred to the state's household, where it is saved. For example, the police officer on the street saves individuals the expense of personal protection. It is a matter of worldview to decide to what extent such tasks must or should be collectively addressed. In England, there has always been a tendency to leave as much as possible to the individual's care, while in Germany, as little as possible, which is related to the fate of both peoples, their situation, and their tradition. In any case, the state relies on this transfer to cover the costs of its activities, to the extent that it does not possess its own assets. And it is part of the sense of duty, bluntly speaking, the commercial integrity of the members of this community, not to embezzle the amount owed at the expense of others. There can be no talk of sacrifice, as there is a mostly unfelt reciprocal benefit, namely everything that distinguishes our situation from that of an outlaw and someone without rights. This clear fact, however, has rarely been fully understood and even less correctly addressed. Taxes have always been perceived as a burden because they were imposed in a biased manner and collected in a

way that caused friction and rubbed individual livelihoods and the entire economic life raw to the point of destroying entire sectors, with a loss of productivity that necessitated an increase in the burden. It applies to financial management as well as legal proceedings: there is a layer of experts and officials who do not know practical economic life from their own experience and, misunderstanding the meaning of state sovereignty, confine themselves to the perspective of their own department: securing the inflow of a certain amount without taking responsibility for the economic consequences or even contemplating them because that is the responsibility of another ministry. In addition, we have a learned financial science that, like legal science, arises from literature and produces literature, without going beyond formal points of classification, methods, and purposes.

The standpoint of government departments is now contrasted with the standpoint of envy and revenge of the parties, which, in the democratic age, selected and approved taxes with a growing desire to burden the politically and economically successful, the possessors, and the thrifty with punishments, while the privileged classes of the 18th century were content to fend them off. One can extract a lot of blood from a living body without harming it, and little with fatal consequences. It depends on the manner and location of the extraction. The resistance is not directed against the levying of taxes in general, which causes tax morale to decline in all nations in difficult situations. However, there is no country today where tax laws are created by experts in the field of economic life in order to achieve the highest possible net yield in the most cost-effective manner without seriously injuring the economic body, if possible even increasing its blood circulation. Other reasons were also influential, none of which originate from the economy itself. Above all, there was a lack of courage to take unpopular measures. The leaders did not dare to ask their own voters to pay taxes directly and instead boosted their morale by allowing them to watch the apparent payment by the opponents, even though the leaders knew very well that some taxes cost more through this detour than they brought in. "Fair distribution of burdens" is a nice phrase, but the question arises as to what extent a nation should allow its satisfaction with such feelings to be paid for with unnoticed additional burdens elsewhere, instead of clarifying to them the essence of the tax cycle. For the parties, however, there was nothing more advantageous. The inheritance tax, for example, is nothing more than a second wealth tax with poor methods and better opportunities for evasion. It could be collected more reliably by determining the average age and distributing the amount over the

corresponding number of years, but the feeling of envy towards the heirs is not taken into account in this case.

In reality, there is a fundamental difference between the taxpayer and the tax bearer, but for sentimental reasons, democracy does not want to acknowledge it, and the tax authorities are indifferent to it. There is no tax that is borne entirely by the one who pays it. In reality, there are neither direct taxes nor luxury taxes in the popular sense. A car tax also affects the poor, a bread tax also affects the rich, namely through the reduction or increase of wages and prices. Only the place of payment is different. An important aspect of economic life is that all burdens are distributed unnoticed from the supporting point. The means for this are wage formation on the one hand and price formation on the other. The real wage does not consist of the amount paid, but of its purchasing power, and the reduction of purchasing power is the only tax that exists for the wage earner, whether it is achieved through a wage deduction or an increase in prices. A tax is not unfair if it is paid by the poor, as they can still relieve themselves through a wage increase up to the limit set by the current economic situation, but it is unfair when it affects individuals within the same social group and not others. However, it is precisely this last aspect that renders all modern tax systems untenable.

As long as the tax needs of the states were low, such as around 1880, the methods were expensive and cumbersome but otherwise without practical consequences. With the growing military expenditures under the influence of the impending world war, particularly since 1890, tax policy developed into an economic war using parliamentary means, led by the politically powerful or those from whom a government had to buy approval for armaments through material concessions, usually the leftist parties, against the rest. This led to an increasing dominance of envy taxes, especially direct taxes, without their defenders realizing that the losses suffered by the opponents were by no means their own gains, but rather diminished through covert defensive measures, new methods of shifting the burden, and tax evasion abroad, while the remainder was devoured due to the growing mass of officials and the continuously increasing costs of collection.

The ideal of direct taxes based on self-assessment, personally paid by every citizen, is now so firmly established that their fairness and effectiveness appear self-evident. Criticism is directed at details, never at the principle itself. However, it did not originate from practical consideration or experience, let

alone from a concern for the preservation of economic life, but rather from the philosophy of Rousseau. It opposes the crude methods of tax farmers and collectors of the 18th century, which were solely focused on revenue, with the concept of inherent human rights based on the notion of the state as a free social contract, contrasting it with the historical development of forms of government. Due to this perspective, it is considered the duty of individual citizens and is part of their dignity to personally assess and pay their share of the burdens imposed by the state. From that moment on, modern tax policy is based on a worldview, initially unconscious but increasingly determined with the democratization of public opinion, that yields to emotions and political sentiments, completely excluding unbiased reflection on the appropriateness of the prevailing procedure. Nonetheless, the idea itself was initially feasible. The structure of the economy at that time was such that individual incomes were all visible and easy to verify. They originated from agriculture, an office, or trade and industry, where, due to the guild organization, everyone could oversee each other's situation. There were no significant hidden incomes to conceal. Similarly, at that time, wealth consisted of immovable and visible assets: land, houses, businesses, and facilities whose owners were known to everyone. However, a transformation has occurred since the end of the century that has altered the entire internal form of the economy, its cycle, and its meaning, which is far more significant than what Marx understands as capitalism, namely, the dominance of the industrial ruling class. Marx's teachings, starting from a hidden envy and thus only perceiving the surface of things, have falsely depicted the accepted image of the economy for a whole century. The impact of its brilliant catchphrases was so significant because it displaced judgments based on experience with judgments based on emotions. Even opponents could not escape its influence, and the entire modern labor legislation is built upon thoroughly Marxist concepts of employees and employers, whereby the latter supposedly do not work. Since these catchphrases were aimed at the working class in the major cities, the sudden rise of large-scale industry in the mid-19th century appeared within the doctrine as the decisive turning point. However, the development was actually very uniform within the realm of large-scale technology. A machinery industry already existed in the 18th century. What is crucial is the rapid detachment of ownership as a property from the possessed objects, accomplished through the intermediation of a certificate of value, namely bonds, shares, and stocks. Individual wealth becomes mobile, invisible, and intangible. It no longer consists of visible things but is only invested in them and can change location and form of investment at

any moment. The owner of a work has simultaneously become a holder of shares. The holders have lost any material connection with the works. They understand neither their performance nor their tasks and do not care about them. They only pay attention to the surplus. They can quickly change, be many or few, and be located anywhere; the shares can accumulate in a few hands, disperse, or go abroad. Nobody knows who truly owns a work. No owner knows the things they possess; they only know the monetary value of this possession according to the stock market price. It is not even known how much of the things within a country's borders actually belong to its inhabitants. Since there is an electric communication service that allows the owner to dispose of the ownership of shares through verbal instruction and transfer it to foreign lands, the domestic share of works within the country can increase or decrease by immense amounts within a stock market hour, depending on whether foreign countries are selling or buying shares, perhaps only for a day. Today, in all economically advanced countries, more than half of the ownership has already become mobile, and its changing holders are scattered across the entire globe, having lost all interest in the work done except for the financial aspect. The entrepreneur, too, has increasingly become an employee and an object of these circles. None of this is recognizable in the works themselves and cannot be accurately determined through any tax method. As a result, the possibility of verifying the fulfillment of tax obligations attached to a person ceases if the holder of changing values does not wish to comply. The same increasingly applies to incomes as well. Freedom of movement, freedom of trade, and the abolition of guilds make individuals independent of control by their professional peers. Since the existence of railways, steamships, newspapers, and telegrams, the exchange of information has taken on forms that free buying and selling from the constraints of space and time. Long-distance purchases dominate the economy. Delivery and forward contracts surpass simple transactions between producers and consumers. The local demand, for which the guilds used to work, is replaced by the commodity exchange, which pits the production, transportation, and acquisition of goods against each other in order to generate speculative profits. For banks, mediating credit has become the main source of profit instead of the bill transactions of the 18th century, and speculation with mobile assets determines, from one day to another, the magnitude of entire national wealth on the stock exchange. As a result, business and speculative incomes also evade any official oversight, leaving only the moderate and small incomes remaining, which, like wages and salaries, are so straightforward that

deception regarding their magnitude is not possible.

This is the great turning point of 1800 that draws a deep boundary between two eras of the economy and quickly renders all the ideologies of Rousseau's time obsolete: not only bourgeois liberalism but also Marx's socialism, which essentially looks at the state of 1848 through the eyes of a liberal from 1789 who had not succeeded and sees only what annoys him and why it annoys him. The entrepreneur is precisely the target of all the resentment because his achievements, often starting as a worker himself, elevate him above others. That's why his achievements are silenced, despite the fact that the existence of urban populations depends on their magnitude, and only the visible expressions of success are depicted. And since socialism in all countries has lost faith in Marx and the communist end goal and now only seeks to provide influence and material benefits to the class it represents, it has reverted to a liberal taste in every practical matter, however outdated that may have become in the meantime.

The visible consequence of this was that the ideal of tax-related human dignity alone was not sufficient to secure the necessary revenue. Thus, the 19th century presents an image of a constantly growing army of tax officials, which, with an enormous expenditure of labor, money, and paperwork, sought to assist the conscientiousness of citizens assessing themselves. This conscientiousness was presupposed by democracy but not found in reality.

Napoleon reduced the number of tax officials from 200,000 to 6,000, and through a rational system, he managed to bring the finances in order, without needing to raise any loans during his rule. However, we are diverting a growing number of capable individuals from productive work, which we need more than ever today, to engage them in the collection and accounting of inefficient taxes. This not only includes the countless people in offices but also an equal number within the economy itself, who must execute or even understand the increasingly complex and impossible regulations and defend against the destructive consequences of this method through ever-new moves.

In 1923, in Germany alone, over a hundred million individual tax declarations were prepared, several hundred million individual payments were made, and almost a billion documents were sent out. In this way, nearly half a million people were taken away from actual work and consumed the majority of tax revenues in advance through their salaries, material consumption, and the costs

of office spaces. This fact is not generally visible because the state budget avoids specifying the net proceeds of taxes, instead stating total revenues, while the collection costs are accounted for elsewhere. This is especially true for the popular, "fair" direct taxes, whose net proceeds are negligible despite the time, trouble, and economic harm involved, or they would be revealed as a deficit if the budget were structured more commercially than bureaucratically.

Of the total taxes and tariffs collected by the Reich and the states in 1913, 691 million came from income tax and 70 million from inheritance tax out of a total of 3,189 million. However, the vast majority of the total costs of financial administration, amounting to 881 million, are attributable precisely to these taxes levied on individuals and not on goods. To cover these expenses, the visible portion of income and wealth is excessively levied because it has to bear the burden of the invisible portion, namely wages and salaries, small businesses, rents, and savings deposits. Intensifying this method would not change this fact since the structure of today's monetary transactions has become so opaque that even tax officials with banking expertise can no longer understand a skillfully drafted balance sheet, and in major cases, only those involved in its preparation know the true meaning of its objectively correct figures.

The limited and uninformed opinion of certain circles firmly clings to this ideal of taxation, even though they are its victims. The "worldview of taxpayers" with its mixture of a sense of justice, envy, anger, and cunning is too effective a tool for democratic parties to be destroyed through criticism. On the other hand, it is the high finance living in the world of stock exchanges that popularly upholds the personal ideal of taxation through its influence on the press and political parties because it relieves them and burdens the opposing powers of the working industry and agriculture with their focus on immovable assets. The self-assessment tax has become a weapon that the capital hidden behind banks and trusts wields through democracy, aiming to transform wealth into more liquid forms and subjugate productive work to the methods of speculation, benefiting neither the worker, the technician, nor the entrepreneur. Even the small saver who owns a few shares can become the victim of financiers and their market policies, as they quietly buy or sell the majority of shares without anyone being able to scrutinize it from the outside.

Thus, declining tax morale, collection costs that devour revenue, burden on labor, relief for speculation, and erosion of immovable national assets in favor of rootless financial capital are the long-standing consequences of the prevailing

tax ideal. Now, the consequences of the fact that the tax needs of all nations have grown immeasurably with the war and even in preparation for it are coming into play. Indebtedness is enormous, the economy is faltering, and society is shaken by the impoverishment of the solid layer of old, well-bred families and the influx of a mass of newly rich of dubious origin and morality, creating tensions in domestic politics. However, this situation gives the street (popular opinion) a decisive influence on tax policy and its political direction. Unless governments themselves emerged under its pressure, they must purchase the freedom of their political actions and inaction with concessions in this very area. Nowadays, no one would dare propose a tax that does not, in the popular perception, hit the "strong shoulders" (in reality, the successful, capable, and thrifty) or at least harm them, even if the practical result remains doubtful. We find ourselves in a time of pronounced tax Bolshevism, which, without much ado, seeks to achieve what was accomplished in Russia through streams of blood: the complete social reshuffling within nations, the dismantling of the old Western European society refined in blood and spirit, saturated with high traditions and forms, until nothing remains but a group of effectively ruling financiers and a proletarian slave mass, both having no connection with the deep-rooted culture that has developed over centuries, neither able to preserve nor dispense with it. In England, as early as 1908, the tax policy initiated by the then-left-radical Lloyd George openly targeted the aristocracy with its immovable and unprofitable land holdings, i.e., the class that had provided offspring for high politics for centuries and is now slowly being crushed by oppressive taxes on land and inheritance. In the Netherlands, the tax laws forced by the radicals in 1918 have the character of a scarcely veiled confiscation of old, visible, honestly acquired business and family assets, which will be depleted within 50 years, especially through inheritance provisions. In Germany, the working economic body is being torn apart like a carcass with countless intersecting, mutually poisoning taxes, with no regard for the loss of blood, in order to extract something everywhere, and in its convulsions, it becomes an incomparable object for professional speculation. It is quite clear what is meant by the terms "assessment of tangible assets" and "interference with substance" even at the highest levels: the consumption of immovable national assets, along with the layer of the middle class and the educated intelligentsia attached to it, from whose fate only financial assets can free themselves through speculative means.

That is Bolshevism. Today, it is hardly dared to demonstrate the disastrous consequences of this redistribution, as they are openly desired by radicalism and

at least not regarded as misfortune by doctrinal democracy. It is the social revolution by non-violent means, which does not behead the bourgeois ministers but buys them, the covert expropriation through tax bills, the emigration of the upper class not from the country but from their possessions. Envy reigns absolutely, the will to burden the diligent, ambitious, and leadership personalities until their destruction. We Germans, as a result of the upheaval, have experienced the secret confiscatory taxes more than other nations, partly due to incompetence and cowardice in front of the voters, partly due to the malicious intent of the responsible parties. First, the inflation, a terrible tax that swallowed up all the small savings and pensions of the middle class, the hard-earned and honestly invested fortunes of the upper classes, and the portions of income that individuals did not immediately squander. Then the tax on unpaid rent, which impoverished property owners, once again a valuable part of the middle class, and forced them to sell the properties to speculators and foreigners, shutting down the construction industry and related industries, increasing unemployment accordingly, and consuming such large sums through tax losses and support for the unemployed that the devaluation of the currency gained even faster pace, and the replacement had to be sought again through burdening visible incomes and diminished purchasing power: it was, in reality, the most expensive rent ever paid. Then the tax on inverted types of taxes, which forced the economy to allocate a significant portion of its thinking and expenditure to tax matters instead of production issues, to restructure or shut down industrial and agricultural enterprises in order to avoid destruction due to the consequences of apparent value growth; finally, the tax to support the eight-hour day, which consisted of consuming the capital of the enterprises, gradually pushing the profitability of businesses to zero, and as a result, had to be borne by the worker in the form of wage cuts and reduced working hours.

The insidious effect of this situation is worse than war and revolution, even if it persists for only a few years. Even the richest country in the world would not be able to endure it indefinitely. But Germany is so poor and economically so sick that it needs liberation sooner than other countries, and here is an area where it should apply its entire organizational ability and intellectual energy to boldly eliminate the senseless and unimaginative tax system, abandon the entire ideology of personal assessment methods, and for the first time build a system that starts from a full awareness of the inner structure of economic life and, through well-considered interventions in the right place, does not paralyze it but rather incentivizes greater production. If the plan and implementation succeed,

Germany would become exemplary within a few years and would be imitated by the whole world. If it fails, our economy is lost.

The solution to this task is relatively easy once it is understood and one has the courage to despise popular prejudices. There would be significant resistance at the beginning. In the end, everyone would be surprised that the obvious took so long to prevail. Therefore, the tax should be understood as the extraction of values from the living stream of the economy, and the key is to identify the areas where intervention can be effective and without causing harm. For individuals, this manifests as a contraction of their small private economy, which is not carried out through personal payment but happens automatically from outside, with no difference whether incomes are reduced or expenses increased. The latter is preferable because it incurs lower costs by replacing the deduction through many millions of individual items with a few large sums. Individuals bear the tax, but they do not pay it. This replaces self-assessment, which only forces a small portion of taxpayers, particularly not the wealthiest, to make honest declarations, with the public estimation of visible values that can be captured by all and, in turn, burden each individual in their expenditure. The apparent injustice is automatically offset through wage formation, so that the net wage amount regains the level determined by the economic situation. Today, every honest taxpayer undoubtedly loses one-tenth of the purchasing power of their income due to the maintenance of tax officials, one-tenth as compensation for speculation evasions, and one-tenth due to the frictional loss in the economy caused by direct taxation.

Therefore, the entire tax requirement would be covered by very few major taxes. Firstly, by the property use tax and head tax proposed by Rabbethge, which form a unity in that the former affects enterprises with a small number of workers and high efficiency, such as optical workshops, more strongly, while the latter affects those with many workers and low efficiency, such as mining and metallurgical works. The property use tax covers all visible things that generate or should generate income, thus having an average market value, such as factories, land, forests, buildings, shops, workshops, and tools, but not the raw materials and inventories themselves. The tax is not based on the actual or pretended value stated in secret self-assessment but on the potential income that can be achieved through good management on average, which is not a secret as the public constantly monitors it through the buying and selling of such things, thus their market value. It is a recurring rent attached to every productive object, regardless

of the accidental owner. It also affects shareholders in the form of lower dividends and stock prices, and thus also applies to foreigners. It provides a strong incentive for better and higher performance because this rent is not increased by more intensive utilization according to the common value, nor reduced by poorer utilization. Since all capital is somehow invested in productive objects to work there, it can be captured here, but only here, and not in the owner's safe or the current shareholder's possession. The head tax to be paid by the enterprises is a supplement and also offers no opportunity for evasion, as no employee has an interest in it, and its number is not a secret.

In addition, I consider a residence tax as the most important of all expenditure taxes to be practical and justified. It would also be a recurring rent, visible in the land registry and publicly known like the rental price, attached to all living spaces, graded according to their airspace, location, amenities, garden surroundings, and accessories (garages, garden houses, social rooms), reduced in relation to the number of residents. It is a rent to be paid by the owners and also extends to guest houses so that foreigners and luxury travelers are also subject to it.

Alongside these, taxes on tobacco and alcohol, as well as a capital gains tax, would be maintained. In conjunction with a stock law, the capital gains tax would burden movable assets, i.e., non-labor-intensive assets, with an additional charge, and it would be even more effective if capital investments and loans could only be confirmed through tax receipts and would otherwise expire. In return, income tax, wage deduction tax, sales tax, inheritance tax, wealth tax, and value-added tax would be entirely abolished, along with the tremendous apparatus for their collection from each individual, the enormous costs involved, and the easy opportunities for evasion. Individuals would neither estimate nor pay their taxes. They would only notice it through the reduction of their net income. The savings made in this way would be equivalent to doubling the yield of all existing taxes; the economy would be free and could dispense with unprofitable defensive measures, and individuals would be free from the burden of benefiting others and the torment of incessant writing and calculating. If this reform does not succeed, one large country after another will fall into the slavery of high finance under the burden of current taxation, which serves only the interests of existing systems.

Work and Property

In the present economic world, industry is the most important element. Since it has increased the human labor infinitely by utilizing natural forces to perform work, it has been able to sustain a larger population in the respective areas than agriculture and craftsmanship could have done until then. However, as industry, with its expanding scale, required more and more human labor to operate its machines, a cycle developed in which ultimately every human life became valuable, leading to the development of modern hygiene because the economy could not do without a single life, and at the same time, the machine became valuable because it was indispensable for the maintenance of this human mass. This has led to the tremendous population increase of the last 60 years. It is a product of the machine and makes people dependent on it. Hence the anxiety in the major industrialized countries about securing sources of raw materials and markets for their enterprises. It is a matter of life and death for entire populations. This is also why industrial workers feel that they are the decisive power. In fact, their entire existence depends on the viability of their industry, and the existence of all the people who exist beyond the population figure of 1800 in Western Europe and North America depends on them.

Industry is more important than agriculture today. If agriculture fails, there is at least a possibility that the rest can sustain itself through its output. If industry fails, the population surplus is lost.

It was unfortunate that the industrial working class, certainly not through their own fault, succumbed to a political movement whose persuasive slogans still completely determine their worldview today. They failed to see themselves as a part of, but rather as the aim and culmination of economic history, and thus misjudged all the driving forces. If it is true that industry currently holds the decisive sway – and in this regard, Marx is undoubtedly correct – it is because of the machine itself and not because of the worker.

In addition to the worker, there is also the technician who created industry as an intellectual entity by transforming knowledge of nature into power over nature, and compelled science to construct its views from the outset as working hypotheses, so that every new law immediately became a lever in the image of the external world. Then came the entrepreneur to turn the technical process into an economic entity. The worker found him, was employed by him, and lived by

him. It is true: he can 'bring all the wheels to a standstill', but he cannot keep them in motion alone. He is also not the only one who works, as Marxism has hammered into the heads of all workers. On the contrary, technicians and entrepreneurs work more than him, with greater intensity, responsibility, and continuous impact.

There is leadership work and executive work. Only together do they constitute industry. They cannot be separated, as each ceases to exist without the other. In contrast to them is the profit-driven labor of speculation, which does not produce anything but presupposes production in order to benefit from it.

In its early days, industry suffered from a strong depersonalization of workers. In the 18th century, the scientific horizon suddenly expanded, and technology lay in broad outlines. Compared to today, the work done back then was extremely crude, simple, uniform, and mechanical. Today, the major outlines are established, and work focuses on refining and deepening specific fields. Instead of just the steam engine, we now have extremely complex specialized machines; instead of mere combustion, the focus is on the extraction and utilization of coal. Every modern industry is governed by intellectual methods that break down into a multitude of individual tasks, each requiring a high level of intelligence, training, and personal ability. The democratic trend that dissolved guilds and trades in the 18th century and drove undifferentiated masses into factories is slowly transforming into an aristocratic trend that elevates a layer of connoisseurs and superior minds from the mass of workers, who tackle specialized tasks bordering on the highest realms of scientific technology. This aristocratic trend permeates both politics and the economy evenly, as they are merely different aspects of the same life, leading to the dissolution of parliamentary conditions in one realm and the development of a class of elevated workers in the other. However, this contradicts everything that Marxist theory predicted as the outcome of development and what it can use for the party. Nowhere is the struggle against this general development as bitter as here, because socialism as a political fact, as a party program, is at stake.

One of Bebel's tirelessly pursued goals, and the greatest crime committed against the German working class, was taking away their ambition for personal achievements and branding advancement within the economy as a betrayal of the workers' cause. It was ignored that half of the great creators of industry had been workers themselves. Only one form of advancement was tolerated and portrayed as the ambition's goal: the career as a secretary and representative within the

party. The talented individual had to turn their back on work if they wanted to earn the respect of the working class. It was intended to be a closed caste in which all value judgments were reversed compared to the outside world. There was no interest in the flourishing of industry, new inventions, methods, organizational possibilities, or the exploration of new sources of raw materials or markets, as that would imply being considered equal to the industry itself.

One of the most important tasks of contemporary popular education is to liberate the people from the burdensome load of cynical concepts about facts and individuals. The working class must be freed from the psychological pressure imposed by a party that only sees useful material in oppressed individuals. Technology provides today's workers with increasing opportunities for the development of their free personalities, for gaining tremendous influence over the design and development of industrial processes, and for nurturing a new generation of leaders from their own ranks. Ambition for such goals should be instilled in the working class, along with the awareness of real power lying solely in intelligence and quality performance. Leadership achievements, and only those, make a person irreplaceable and indispensable. Therefore, the despicable method, in which the party and its program sacrifice the interests of the workers themselves in favor of the goals of a paid leadership, namely the wage system that punishes higher performance, suspects diligence, considers quality as betrayal, and ridicules learning by adhering to the mechanical uniformity of 1800 and closing its eyes to the facts of differentiation in 1900, must be condemned in the public consciousness, despite better knowledge. If we are to talk about Russia, let it serve as an example that the best groups of skilled workers there receive two to three times the wages of their German counterparts, while unskilled workers earn considerably less than in our country, and within the same category, the wage gap between the lowest and highest groups in Germany in 1923 was barely one-fifth, while in Russia, it was more than double. What we need are guilds inspired by the Russian model, groups of skilled workers of varying sizes with self-organization, strict selection of members, and their own leadership, which negotiates with factory managers regarding the scope of work, wage levels, and intensity of performance, while ensuring strict adherence to commitments by every individual worker in the interest of the group itself.

Although work may be considered a commodity, as materialism of 1850 understood it, it is something more, namely a personal achievement. The

entrepreneur also works as a leader, but they provide work of higher quality, without which they would not succeed. The talented, diligent, and ambitious worker should view them with the belief that their own skills open the path to similar leadership work, a belief that has been proven countless times. This perspective should dominate the young worker – it embodies a worldview – as well as the idea that the leadership of the working class belongs to the workers themselves, the strong, intelligent, superior ones, within the working economy itself, and not to a swarm of paid party officials led by former journalists and lawyers who live off the work of the workers and must secure the indispensability of their positions by fostering heightened emotions.

On the other hand, above the life mission of the entrepreneur should be the principle: Property entails obligations. Property, understood with all the moral seriousness of Germanic life, also contains a kind of socialism, a Prussian, not English, imperative: Treat your property as if it were entrusted to you by the people. Regard it as a collection of power relationships that can create work and happiness in all directions if used correctly. If we were to use the catchphrase of the previous century, there are two types of capitalists: the entrepreneur and the speculator. The latter possesses capital, while the former possesses a productive enterprise. The former creates, while the latter exploits what has been created. When Marx was alive, the stock market was already a force, but it was so close to his own instincts that he only perceived others as adversaries. "Expropriation of the expropriators" – as the Russian expropriation has shown – means the subjugation of industrial leaders, the "foremen" of the first rank, to speculation. What Russia has also proven is that the type of professional worker leader who engages in speculative tactics is closely related to high finance.

Property entails obligations, and the violation of this duty should indeed lead to a corresponding curtailment of rights. Laws that prevent the abuse of property cannot be strict enough. This should primarily be the responsibility of stock market legislation, which seeks to limit the exploitation of immovable works and goods through speculation by ensuring continuous control over various forms of value depreciation.

However, there is another danger inherent in entrepreneurship that is often overlooked and cannot be considered carefully enough: In the early days of individual enterprises, the great talents were identified early, liberated early, and placed in responsible positions early. This is how Siemens, Krupp, Borsig, and many others rose to prominence. Since then, the increasing consolidation of

entire economic sectors has led to the bureaucratization of management, making it difficult to identify and cultivate talent. The greatest danger of conglomerate formation is the destruction of an equally capable next generation, and coupled with the deeply ingrained German inclination to want to stand alone, do everything oneself, and not develop trusted colleagues, deputies, or successors, the drawbacks of any planned economy and socialization, as well as the atrophy of the leadership class, also become evident for entirely different reasons. Economic freedom has brought about the tremendous successes for which we owe Germany's prosperity and growth before the war. It is the personal impact of individual abilities that causes industries, shipping, trade, and every other economic sector to rise or fall. And this freedom is equally threatened by conglomerates as it is by state coercion. Both take away the free will of creative individuals in order to replace it with a scheme. Both hinder the ascent of the capable because working with mediocrity is more convenient.

Finally, one more point that is usually underestimated: Every major enterprise in the economy is inherently political in nature. Regardless of what it may produce, once it reaches a certain size, everything has a political aspect. If someone in such a position neglects political action and contemplation, that too has political consequences. However, the danger for economic specialists lies much less in underestimating politics than in confusing it with purely economic tasks. Economic policy can be an essential aspect of broader politics and has always been, but it is not a substitute for it. Those who believe otherwise will inevitably fail. The economic life of today's people takes place within large entities formed by political boundaries. Therefore, it is correct to say that the existence of states has an economic aspect, even more so because the political aspect always remains decisive, and any misunderstanding of this fact has had bitter repercussions. In conclusion, it seems to me that these should be the major goals of the German economy: nurturing a leading working class with the aptitude for the highest tasks within the enterprises themselves, fostering ambition in this direction, educating a new generation through the free structuring of the enterprises, perceiving ownership of productive assets as an obligation to the nation, and viewing this duty as applicable to high politics as well.

On the state oft the world

A nation whose will is completely excluded from world politics and whose responsible representation considers renouncing politics as its task, in the belief that it can thus evade the consequences of politics, seems to need nothing less than to reflect on the global situation. And indeed, the German citizen, as far as he does not defend or fight party positions, engages in what is called politics, dealing with questions that relate to the provincial egoism of states and regions.

Nevertheless, I do not see how we can achieve a position that restores our status and the freedom of action of an independent state, if we do not closely follow the course of world events, which are heading towards great restlessness and increasing tension with unknown complications.

Even if one refrains from openly expressing specific possibilities, a mere glance at the circumstances is already beneficial, as it shows, even without any intervention from any side, the emergence of such possibilities. The virtue of defeated nations is patience, not resignation.

The fact that completely dominates the current world situation is the unexpected rise of France as the absolutely leading political power. England has receded into the background due to the mistakes of its diplomacy. For the first time in centuries, it is completely placed at the service of French intentions through a superior tactic that skillfully alternates between threat, persuasion, and hesitation. American desires are coolly rejected. Others are not even heard.

The French people, with their 39 million, march in last place among the great nations. They have long been the poorest in terms of births. In terms of their intellectual state, they are very old, very refined, very worn-out. They have also become politically old. For fifty years, they have nourished only one thought: the desire for revenge for a lost war. In the meantime, other nations have organized colonial empires, built industries, and created a world of social institutions. France has remained unproductive in every sense, as a land of soldiers and pensioners. 'We French will conquer nothing anymore,' Zola said to a visitor in those years when in Paris, through the beatification of Joan of Arc, a kind of military cult was created for the already planned world war. And now? A nation that was on the path to abdicate like the Spanish after glorious centuries, a nation

that was saved only by the Anglo-Saxon bayonets and billions, is now playing with the destiny of its saviors. It has completely forgotten who ultimately forced the victory. It is convinced of having won alone and therefore claims the right to even greater successes.

For France is the only country whose ruling circles are always guided first and foremost by the ambition awakened by Robespierre and Danton, and trained by Napoleon's ambition for the grande nation. This tradition, which tolerates no contradiction either internally or externally, will always prefer loud glory to economic advancement, always choose the enjoyment of military triumphs over prudence, and always prefer a shining moment to a less brilliant but creative future. Having grown old, internally sick, and exhausted from the blood loss it cannot replenish, the country has been in a hysterical and sadistic frenzy for the past five years. France itself is deluded about the seriousness of the social and economic goals of French politicians, and perhaps these politicians are deluding themselves as well. France is the only country in the world that has been willing, since the Battle of Marengo, to even accept a severe civil war to secure the exercise of its power abroad by the military. And this will to power always means a will to destroy. It is beyond the possibilities of the French character, and even more so beyond the inclinations of French taste, to see conquered lands prosper economically, to turn yesterday's enemies into tomorrow's friends. The French are the bloodiest and most unsuccessful colonizers there are. From Louis XIV's plundering wars, where without any greater goals he drew a desert belt along the eastern border, to the mistreatment of European peoples from Madrid to Moscow by Napoleon's armies, which ultimately led to the downfall of his empire, the expression of French feelings of victory has always remained the same.

And just as everything about them is old—the character, the spirit, the expression of the sense of power—so are the goals of this power today. The entire politics is with increasing clarity a resumption of Napoleonic plans. These 39 million people want to be the masters of Europe and thus of the world, to humiliate, devastate, and destroy the other powers. What was still an indefinite urge in 1919 under the impression of an unexpected success is now a plan pursued with the complete clarity and energy of the French mind. One is amazed to see how the Rhine line is being fortified, with the ruins of Germany to lie before it as glacis, while the Ruhr area is to serve as outer forts, providing access to the North Sea, the Little Entente securing the land bridge along the Danube to

the Middle East, and the gigantic possessions in Northwest Africa covering the way to the Nile.

There is no doubt that Poincaré is the best diplomat of the old school who holds a leading position somewhere today. But as always in France, he and each of his successors are merely the executing organs of circles for whom external success is the condition for remaining in office. Napoleon knew full well that the first backward step on the path of military successes meant the end of his rule. That is why, since the retreat from Moscow, he was no longer able to enter into serious peace negotiations, as had been repeatedly attempted in 1813 and 1814, which he openly admitted to Prince Metternich. For the same reason, the Bourbons needed the war in Spain in 1823, the Orleans in Algeria in 1833, Napoleon III the Crimean War in 1854, then the war in Italy in 1859, the war in Mexico from 1861, and a war against Germany since 1867. Therefore, future elections, as long as they confirm today's politics, will mean a series of purely political wars, behind which the exploitation of foreign countries must become the second objective to the same extent as the currency and the situation of the French pensioner deteriorate due to inadequate tax policies. This also corresponds to the practice of the Revolution and Napoleon.

France no longer leaves any doubt today that it seeks power from Germany primarily, not money. The Ruhr area is a necessary step on the old Napoleonic path. It is precisely where Napoleon established the Grand Duchy of Berg in 1806, leaving no doubt about its military purposes. The following year, the Kingdom of Westphalia was formed to the northeast, with its troops becoming part of the French army. Furthermore, in 1810, the French annexed the German North Sea coast, aiming towards a similar goal that in the summer of 1923, naval circles demanded the occupation of Bremen and Hamburg. Disarmed Germany has no means to prevent the sudden occupation of the North Sea ports and their transformation into impregnable bases for French air squadrons and submarines. This would enable the revival of the Continental System of 1806, which attempted to isolate Europe from England, with better prospects. A modern shock column can cover the distance from the Ruhr area to the North Sea in a single day.

In the south, France's vast consolidated holdings in North Africa present a new factor that Napoleon did not encounter during his expedition to Egypt, allowing France today to repeat its advance with entirely different prospects. A new Fashoda is being prepared, against which England has no serious power to

oppose. In Africa, a black million-man army is emerging, at the disposal of the rulers in Paris and, under certain circumstances, French capital. There are hints that in the event of a revolution, the government could and would rely on black troops. In Sudan, France is conducting large-scale forced recruitment by granting citizenship to the colored population. It is training the Africans in the tactics and organization of modern armies, while also teaching them to consider the limits of the power of a white population. General Mangin publicly declared, in a manner understood in Africa, that France militarily represents not forty, but one hundred million people. Today, this army of black Frenchmen already has the potential to become the master of Africa whenever it desires. A network of strategic railways is intended to bring the Niger and the Congo closer to Morocco and Algeria. With control over Morocco, France would be capable at any time of closing the Mediterranean by occupying Tangier, thereby placing Italy in a very difficult position by cutting off its supply of coal and food.

Thirdly, the open attempts to dissolve western and southern Germany into a series of dependent small states also correspond to a Napoleonic idea: the creation of a land bridge along the Danube to the Orient. This would completely encircle the Mediterranean from the north and south, seal off the Black Sea, and bring the access points to Southwest Asia under French control. The gradual transformation of southern European states, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia into French protectorates serves this goal. Through the granting of military credits, the training of excessive armies by French officers, and the silent penetration of French capital, a dense chain of French bases has already been established from the Baltic Sea to the mouth of the Danube. This is the same staging area that Napoleon organized for his campaign to Moscow. Even then, Poland was nothing more than a French province.

Finally, the economic aspect: France currently possesses 5.3 million tons of iron ore, compared to England's 1 million and Germany's mere 0.77 million. Together with the Ruhr area, France controls 35 percent of Europe's coal production. When Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are added to the equation, countries whose military domination allows France to freely exploit their economic resources, French interests account for 60 percent of European production, compared to England's 25 percent and Germany's 4 percent. Thus, France possesses the largest armory in Europe, in connection with the world's most strategically important resource depots.

This is the situation in Europe in the "Age of Reparations," and it would be a

mistake to continue treating the reparations issue solely as a matter of compensating for war damages. With the sums that Germany has paid so far, under pressure from England, France has expanded its air fleet. The German Saar coal, with which France does business in Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland, has facilitated further army reinforcements and the provision of armament credits to the Balkan states. Each new billion will mean new air squadrons, submarines, and black regiments.

In contrast, England has become diplomatically uncertain and weak. A country with these global responsibilities does not appoint trade unionists like Lloyd George and Ramsay Macdonald to lead it without consequences. It is repeatedly evident that popular assemblies and class parties make for poor schools for foreign policymakers. France owes its great successes to the fact that all its leading men have gone through the school of Petersburg during the time of the Entente Cordiale. Diplomacy is a craft in itself that should not be confused with war, economics, or factional political tactics.

The forms in which the world's destiny has been moving since the war are changing rapidly and have already eliminated the system of co-equal great powers with its network of tensions and alliances that formed the basis of politics from 1815 to 1914, just as Napoleon eliminated the state system of the ancien régime. The United States entered the system since the Spanish War, and Japan since the Chinese War, without changing it, with its standing armies, fleets, and a series of maritime bases along all the coasts of the oceans. The purpose of the latter was to render naval decisions on land unnecessary or ineffective, and to replace naval battles with the blockade of all coasts where merchant ships or fleets could be found. Today, we observe a groping for new forms. Due to the political and military awakening of Africa by France, which is being supported by American Negroes with substantially different intentions, and the awakening of Asia by Bolshevism, the great landmass suddenly seems to gain the upper hand, preempting naval decisions that have always been somehow English, and in the complete mastery of which England's strength has lain until now, by rendering the fleet useless through the control of coasts from the hinterland. South Africa, as evidenced by the fall of Smuts, has recognized its prospects. In India, with Russian or Japanese intelligence, they are about to do the same. And the world of Islam, which is entirely landlocked and stretches from Morocco to China, has received a mental impetus from the world war that makes any kind of surprise possible, such as we have not seen since Genghis

Khan.

The fate of Russia cannot be separated from that of Asia. Russia, by symbolically moving its capital from St. Petersburg to Moscow, has taken a step back that Peter the Great had taken: to constitute itself as a European power, making the major ambassadorial posts in Western states the focus of Russian politics and treating Asia as a means to European ends. Today, the reverse is true. Although original Bolshevism was itself of Western European origin and structure, it could not be entirely clear about this. However, with Lenin's death, it has come to an end. This Caesar-like figure, the most significant since Rhodes, always lived with the idea of maintaining a secret army of communist organizations in all Western states, in place of the Tsar's ambassadors, which would one day set out and realize Alexander I's dream of a holy alliance under Russian protection in a revolutionary form under the Soviet star. With his death, the aura of the ideal has ended, not only the personality that embodied it. This is particularly true as the economic forms of the ideal have completely failed, despite the rivers of blood, and the vast territory is no longer preservable due to the accelerated return to private ownership and private business. In the peasantry of the Russian and Asian lands, from the Vistula to the borders of India and China, across which all great civilizations have so far slipped like shadows, religious fervor is stirring, half-Christian Orthodox, half-disguised as Bolshevism, barely conscious of its true nature. From it, a great phenomenon may emerge one day, fundamentally changing the image of Asia and with it the diplomatic goals and hopes of the world. Perhaps one day the holy revolution will break out as bloody as the red revolution once did. Is the deep agitation in Islam any different? Is the appearance of a true caliph, who does not need to dispute his recognition because suddenly no one doubts his calling, beyond all possibility?

This secret inclination of events is thwarted by the obvious fact that the internal politics of all countries today intervene in the major events in a different way than before the war. Previously, it occurred through purely parliamentary pressure from radical parties on the government, either to release armament measures only in exchange for concessions or to redirect the course of foreign policy, with very little success. The idea of a revolution had practically disappeared from the thinking of revolutionaries. Standing armies were generally considered a weapon against which any resistance was futile. However, the war has shown how limited the effectiveness of this weapon can be within our stone

cities, and it has also changed the soul of the soldier, who now has political convictions and may make his actions dependent on them. In addition, the overriding importance of air and submarine weapons with their very small crew has changed the question. Today, radicalism in all countries is revolutionary again and has specific ideas about possible decisions using violence. It also has its own diplomacy from one country to another, the mere existence of which pushes major politics into new forms. Inner France is faced with the choice between chauvinism and syndicalism; there is no doubt about that. Failures abroad and the destruction of the triumphal mood of 1918 mean the uprising of Paris, also meaning the decision of whether to dare to lead black troops against white workers. Similar questions exist in every country today, and thus, on the other side, the side of tradition of national power, honor, and inherited property, the consciousness arises that they are no longer bound by the existing forms. Today, coup d'état and dictatorship are integral parts of the style of political action, all the more so as they are entirely compatible with the preservation of parliamentary forms, even English ones.

But with this, the decision is shifted from problems of form to the existence and will of strong personalities. Soviet Russia was Lenin, South Africa was Rhodes, Mussolini is Italy. No parliament, no party, no army today has decisions in its hands per se. They are found everywhere and exclusively in the existence or nonexistence of individual men, their personal decisions, ideas, and goals. There is no longer a limit as even the strongest found in the existing conditions at the time of Bismarck. This is the prospect possessed by even the smallest country.

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